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ABSTRACT 
This thesis covers the exploitation of contraband laborers during the American Civil War 
in the Hampton Roads region of Virginia, the South Carolina Sea Islands, and Washington, D.C. 
In addition, it analyzes the actions of Union military commanders charged with care of the 
contrabands, and the failure of the federal government to create a uniform policy outlining how 
military officials should treat the contrabands.  The thesis covers abuses ranging from failure to 
pay wages to a lack of medical care to the construction of disease-ridden camps to the 
impressment of contrabands for labor or military enlistment.  It argues that military commanders 
in all three regions, despite numerous differences, including a military campaign in Virginia, 
leasing in South Carolina, and a lack of farmland in Washington, mistreated contraband laborers 
in order to reduce government relief expenditures, avoid dependency, instill an ideology of self-
reliance, and focus resources on the war effort.  The federal government, meanwhile, did little to 
stop such abuses or create a policy banning the mistreatment of contrabands.  The thesis 
examines each region chronologically and provides comparative analysis throughout.  As the 
evidentiary base, it uses letters of military officers, newspapers, military reports, correspondence, 
and other records, petitions sent to Congress and the President, letters from missionaries, aid 
workers lessees, and other Northern observers, and letters and petitions written by the 
contrabands themselves.  The research for this thesis was completed at the University of 
Virginia, Duke University, the University of North Carolina, The College of William and Mary, 
the Library of Virginia, the Library of Congress, and the National Archives in Washington, D.C. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
By late 1863, nine-year-old Carter Holmes should have had reason to celebrate.  He had 
escaped slavery and found freedom within the Union lines at Washington, D.C.  However, 
instead of placing him in school so he could obtain the education denied him in slavery, military 
authorities too concerned about dependency and making the contrabands work apprenticed him 
to a Maryland man who agreed to provide food, clothing, and schooling in return for Holmes’s 
labor.  Government authorities failed to ensure the man’s compliance and he brutally abused 
Holmes for three years before the boy finally ran away from an employer no better than a slave 
master.1 
This unfortunate incident was not a unique case during the Civil War.  Throughout the 
war, military authorities defrauded, mistreated, exploited, and physically abused contrabands, 
who they often saw as a hindrance to the larger war effort and a drain on scarce government 
resources.  At the start of the war, military authorities focused on the Fugitive Slave Act and the 
maintenance of loyalty from the Border States and refused to accept contrabands into the lines.2  
Even after Congress changed federal policy and ordered the army to accept fugitives, according 
to historian James Oakes, the Union army was overwhelmed by emancipation and was 
unprepared for the large numbers of freedmen who entered its camps and Congress, while 
                                                          
1 Ira Berlin, Steven F. Miller, Joseph P. Reidy, and Leslie S. Rowland, ed., Freedom: A Documentary History of 
Emancipation 1861-1867, Selected from the Holdings of the National Archives of the United States, Series I, Volume 
II, The Wartime Genesis of Free Labor: The Upper South (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 259.  
2 Ibid, 245.  
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ordering the army to accept contrabands, did little to ensure humane treatment or prevent abuse, 
allowing military authorities to make their own decisions regarding the welfare of the 
contrabands.3  In addition, military authorities focused on instituting a system of free labor and 
ensuring the contrabands worked while, according to historian Louis Gerteis, trying to prevent 
“violent and fundamental changes in the society and economy of the crumbling Confederacy,” 
which resulted in a system of plantation labor quite similar to the slavery the contrabands had 
escaped.4  Even worse, army authorities failed to address overcrowding and disease within the 
contraband camps, which they saw as temporary employment depots rather than permanent 
refugee camps. Such abuse led to devastating outbreaks of smallpox and other diseases that 
killed thousands of contrabands before they had a chance to truly experience freedom.  As James 
Oakes writes, “The contrabands-sometimes frozen, often starving- got sick and died in the very 
process that was supposed to free them.”5  This paper will examine mistreatment and abuse of 
contrabands by army officers in the field and the failure of governmental authorities to create a 
uniform policy to address such abuse in three very different regions of the South: the Hampton 
Roads region of eastern Virginia, the South Carolina Sea Islands, and the Union capital in 
Washington, D.C. 
Across the country during the Civil War, slaves ran to Union lines seeking freedom and 
protection from their owners.  According to Ira Berlin, slaves “struggled to secure their liberty, 
reconstitute their families, and create institutions befitting a free people” by escaping slavery and 
                                                          
3 James Oakes, Freedom National: The Destruction of Slavery in the United States, 1861-1865 (New York: W.W. 
Norton and Company, 2013), 139, 396, 420; Gene Dattel, Cotton and Race in the Making of America: The Human 
Costs of Economic Power (Lanham, MD: Ivan R. Dee Publisher, 2009), 209.  
4 Louis S. Gerteis, From Contraband to Freedman: Federal Policy Toward Southern Blacks 1861-1865 (Westport: CT, 
Greenwood Press, 1973), 5.  
5 Oakes, Freedom National, 428.  
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fleeing to Union lines.6  Furthermore, according to Oakes, slaves recognized that the Union 
military represented a “counter-state” that protected freedom in the South and remained beyond 
the reach of slaveholders.7  Such information passed quickly amongst the slave population, 
causing thousands of slaves to flee to what they saw as an army of liberation.8  Especially after 
the Emancipation Proclamation, when the freedom of slaves fleeing to Union lines was officially 
recognized, slaves believed that freedom was guaranteed if they reached the Union army and 
were willing to work for wages.9  These trends would hold true across all three regions, as slaves 
recognized that they could find freedom for themselves and their families by reaching Union 
lines. 
In Virginia, the first contrabands ran to Union lines and military authorities haltingly 
developed a policy of hiring contrabands for military labor while also instituting a policy of farm 
labor on the limited number of abandoned plantations in the region.10  In the South Carolina Sea 
Islands, meanwhile, all of the local whites ran away, leaving behind cotton plantations and 
thousands of slaves, which led to land sales and plantation leasing, allowing northern 
businessmen to abuse and mistreat contraband laborers in addition to exploitation by government 
authorities.11  In Washington, D.C., on the other hand, contrabands worked almost exclusively 
for the government, but military authorities did little to address conditions at the overcrowded 
contraband camps, which were plagued with disease and rampant destitution throughout the 
war.12  During the Civil War, military authorities focused on enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act, 
                                                          
6 Berlin, ed., Freedom: The Upper South, 1.  
7 Oakes, Freedom National, 89. 
8 Ibid, 106.  
9 Ibid, 344.  
10 Gerteis, From Contraband to Freedman, 20, 41.  
11 Oakes, Freedom National, 197-199.  
12 Berlin, ed., Freedom: The Upper South, 244, 247-251.  
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instituting a system of free labor rather than dependence on government charity, and avoiding the 
removal of resources from the larger war effort. As a result, they mistreated, exploited, and 
abused contrabands while federal authorities more focused on winning the war did little or 
nothing to create a uniform policy that would end such abuses.  
The historiography on the topic of contrabands during the Civil War emerged relatively 
recently.  Early histories either tended to ignore the contrabands entirely or, according to Gerteis, 
created racist arguments claiming that “antislavery men sought to destroy the social and 
economic order of the South” and portraying African-Americans as objects of white actions and 
decisions.13  In a typical example of the period, Edgar W. Knight, writing in 1918, argued that 
Northern teachers who came to the South to educate contrabands were “despicable” and that 
their abolitionist ideas would only harm race relations.14  Such arguments lasted until the 1960s 
and 1970s, when the Civil Rights Movement prompted historians to examine the “long-neglected 
Negro.”15  In his work, Louis Gerteis analyzes federal contraband policy in Virginia, Louisiana, 
and Mississippi and gives vivid detail of the conditions faced by contrabands, but still portrays 
white officials and the government as the main actors and contrabands as passive recipients of 
federal decisions.16  Willie Lee Rose’s 1964 work also echoes these trends, as she focuses almost 
completely on the actions of Northern missionaries in the South Carolina Sea Islands and how 
their decisions affected the contrabands, who are also portrayed as passive rather than active 
participants in the free labor experiment.17   
                                                          
13 Gerteis, From Contraband to Freedman, 3.  
14 Ronald E. Butchart, Schooling the Freed People: Teaching, Learning, and the Struggle for Black Freedom, 1861-
1876 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), x.  
15 Gerteis, From Contraband to Freedman, 3.  
16 Ibid.  
17 Willie Lee Rose, Rehearsal for Reconstruction: The Port Royal Experiment (London, Oxford University Press, 
1964).  
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It would take until the 1980s for works to emerge that truly focused on the contrabands 
and how they worked to gain their own freedom and livelihoods despite government neglect. In 
1979, Leon Litwack’s work explored the end of slavery from the perspective of the contrabands, 
and included material about the camps and how contrabands struggled to earn a living despite 
horrid conditions.  He argues that the “camps soon became overcrowded, disease took a heavy 
toll, the promised wages were often not paid, and many slaves came to feel they had been 
defrauded” but also that the “slaves themselves undermined the authority of the planter class” 
and tried their best to remain independent despite abuse and neglect by army authorities.18  James 
Oakes, meanwhile, in his recent work, focuses on federal policy and the antislavery legacy of the 
Republican Party stretching back through the 1850s, but also includes copious detail on 
contrabands and their contributions to their own freedom, and how policies passed in 
Washington failed to correct horrendous conditions in the camps, as unprepared army officers 
often made their own decisions with little federal guidance.  He argues that slaves running to 
Union lines forced the government to create a contraband policy, clearly indicating his focus on 
the contrabands as active participants in their own freedom.19  This trend is reflected in another 
recent work by Jim Downs, who argues that army authorities saw contrabands as a burden and 
failed to provide proper medical care, resulting in thousands of deaths from disease in the camps, 
which could have been prevented with proper medical intervention.20  He also focuses on the 
contrabands themselves and how they attempted to maintain a living despite the deadly 
conditions in the camps.   
                                                          
18 Leon F. Litwack, Been in the Storm So Long: The Aftermath of Slavery (New York: Vintage Books, 1980), 130, 133, 
137.  
19 Oakes, Freedom National, 166, 105, 416. 
20 Jim Downs, Sick from Freedom: African-American Illness and Suffering during the Civil War and Reconstruction 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 4.  
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Other recent historians also reflect this trend in works of local and regional history that 
also include material on contraband camps.  Multiple historians have analyzed contraband camps 
in the nation’s capital.  While Margaret Leech included some material on the topic in her 1941 
work, she focused on federal authorities and missionaries and included racially insensitive 
statements, such as “this primitive and childlike people,” whom she portrayed as passive 
victims.21  More recent authors, including Kenneth Winkle, Kate Masur, Allan Johnston, and 
Robert Poole, have included detailed discussions on conditions in contraband camps, the fugitive 
slave debate, and the vital contributions of contraband labor to the Union war effort in the 
capital, all while portraying the contrabands as active participants.22  In his work, Winkle argues 
that Union authorities placed the war effort and profit motives above contraband welfare, 
resulting in few improvements to horrendous conditions.  Furthermore, he discusses the impact 
of Border State loyalty in the decision to return contrabands as fugitives.23  Masur, meanwhile, 
focuses on the desire of contrabands for equal rights and better treatment, particularly their 
protests of fugitive renditions.24  Johnston and Poole, in contrast, focus on the horrific conditions 
in the camps and blame federal officials for failing to take corrective action.25  Poole, however, 
blames unpreparedness for federal inaction, while Johnston argues for deliberate choice.26  This 
regional historiographic trend is exemplified in works on eastern Virginia, as historians Glenn 
                                                          
21 Margaret Leech, Reveille in Washington: 1860-1865 (New York: New York Review of Books, 1941), 307.  
22 Kenneth J. Winkle, Lincoln’s Citadel: The Civil War in Washington, D.C. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 
2013); The Smithsonian Anacostia Museum and Center for African-American History and Culture, The Black 
Washingtonians: The Anacostia Museum Illustrated Chronology (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2005); Kate 
Masur, An Example for All the Land: Emancipation and the Struggle Over Equality in Washington, D.C. (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2010); Allan Johnston, Surviving Freedom: The Black Community of Washington, 
D.C. 1860-1880 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1993); Robert M. Poole, On Hallowed Ground: The Story of 
Arlington National Cemetery (New York: Walker and Company, 2009).  
23 Winkle, Lincoln’s Citadel, 233, 349.  
24 Masur, Example for all the Land, 4, 11.  
25 Johnston, Surviving Freedom, xxiii, 101.  
26 Ibid; Poole, Hallowed Ground, 35.  
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David Brasher and Robert Engs have written monographs exclusively focused on the experiences 
of the contrabands, their contribution to the Union war effort, and their struggle to form 
independent communities despite terrible conditions.27  The historiography on contrabands, 
therefore, has come a long way since the racist polemics of the early twentieth century, as 
historians have moved from portraying contrabands as passive victims of federal neglect to 
active participants in the struggle for better conditions. 
This paper will make new contributions to this historiography.  It will add a comparative 
analysis by examining contraband camps and federal contraband policy in South Carolina, 
Virginia, and Washington, D.C. and by examining how vastly different military and economic 
circumstances in each region affected the development of contraband policy.  Furthermore, it 
will use the voices of the contrabands themselves, as found in testimony, letters, and petitions, to 
tell the story of government mistreatment and of the efforts of the contrabands to fight for their 
basic rights.  Finally, it will examine the difference between policies enacted in Washington and 
the actual reality on the ground in the camps, as army officers fitfully tried to create policy with 
little guidance from government authorities. 
In addition, this paper is written as a moral history.  In his work, Harry S. Stout states that 
moral history “imbues the present with a heightened sensitivity to what actors might have done, 
what they ought to have done, and, what, in fact, they actually did.”28  This paper echoes his 
argument by not only describing federal mistreatment of contrabands, but by indicating how they 
could have easily helped the contrabands if they had given their welfare higher priority.  In 
addition, this work also undermines the idea of emancipation as an “unambiguous moral 
                                                          
27 Glenn David Brasher, The Peninsula Campaign and the Necessity of Emancipation: African-Americans and the 
Fight for Freedom (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012); Robert F. Engs, Freedom’s First 
Generation: Black Hampton, Virginia, 1861-1890 (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004).   
28 Harry S. Stout, Upon the Altar of the Nation: A Moral History of the Civil War (New York: Viking, 2006), xii. 
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triumph,” which fails to address federal exploitation of the freed slaves.29  While certainly not 
criticizing the morality of the decision for emancipation itself, this work highlights the horrific 
conditions and mistreatment faced by contrabands and the failure of a government that passed 
the Emancipation Proclamation to correct such abuses. As Stout writes, “Only when the reader 
hears the anguished cries of the suffering… will the full moral dimensions” of the Civil War be 
revealed and the complete story of emancipation told.30 
During the war, federal policy related to fugitive slaves evolved gradually from complete 
exclusion to hiring contrabands as government laborers, but still failed to adequately address the 
problems in the camps.  Most of the policy, and indeed the term “contraband” itself, rose out of 
military necessity, as army officials saw the benefits of removing laborers from the Confederate 
war effort and adding them to the Union military machine.31  In addition, giving the fugitives 
status as “contrabands” made them enemy property eligible for confiscation, but also did not free 
them, allowing antislavery policy to develop at a slower pace.32  Early in the war, meanwhile, 
many army officers banned fugitives from camps due to fears of Border State loyalty, espionage, 
and the difficulty of determining whether a slave’s master was loyal or disloyal.33  The First 
Confiscation Act, passed in 1861, freed fugitives who had been forced to work for the 
Confederate war effort along with their families, but any other fugitives were still excluded from 
Union lines.34  Thousands of slaves still ran to Union lines, however, contributing to Congress’s 
decision to pass the Second Confiscation Act to further clarify the fugitive slave issue.  The Act 
freed all slaves of disloyal masters regardless of whether they had worked for the Confederate 
                                                          
29 Ibid, xvi.   
30 Ibid, xxii. 
31 Oakes, Freedom National, 98, 102-103.    
32 Ibid, 102-103.  
33 Ibid, 182. 
34 Ibid, 138-141.  
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war effort, and crucially for the contrabands, authorized the “President to employ black men 
within the Union army” to perform labor vital to the Union war effort.35  At the same time, 
Lincoln banned the army from returning any fugitives and ordered “reasonable wages” for 
contraband laborers, a policy that was often ignored by officers in the field, resulting in 
contrabands across the South receiving little or no pay for government labor.36  When Lincoln 
signed the Emancipation Proclamation, which was largely based on the Second Confiscation Act, 
in January 1863, the fugitive slave question was finally resolved in favor of the contrabands.37   
These policies, however, did little to regulate the everyday lives of the contrabands, and 
failed to correct abuses such as lack of wages, denial of rations, inadequate shelter, mistreatment 
by soldiers, and denial of even basic medical care.  The federal government did not provide 
adequate guidance to its military officers, resulting in an army completely unprepared for the 
scope of the contraband camps.  While, as Oakes writes, “labor in service to the Union remained 
a crucial guarantor of emancipation” for the contrabands, federal policy did not ensure that such 
labor was rewarded with decent and humane treatment.38 
Such mistreatment can be explained in part by the pervasive racism in the North during 
the Civil War.  Many northerners, not just lessees or army officials, held racist attitudes and did 
not support programs to uplift contraband laborers in the South. A significant portion of 
Northerners, according to Rose, opposed charity for anyone, including the contrabands, due to 
the “implications of paternalism and condescending benevolence that it conveyed” despite the 
                                                          
35 Ibid, 226-238. 
36 Ibid, 248.  The lack of wages for contrabands is indicated by the primary documents in each region of Berlin’s 
Freedom collection.  
37 Ibid, 301. 
38 Ibid, 201.  For additional coverage of federal antislavery policy during the war, see Eric Foner, A Fiery Trial: 
Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2010), Gerteis, From Contraband 
to Freedman, William C. Harris, Lincoln and the Border States: Preserving the Union (Lawrence: University of Kansas 
Press, 2011), Hans L. Trefousse, Lincoln’s Decision for Emancipation (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975), and Allen C. 
Guelzo, Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation: The End of Slavery in America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004).  
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fact that the contrabands clearly were destitute.39  Many saw the contrabands as “children” 
incapable of making their own decisions, and these attitudes remained prominent among those 
charged with helping the contrabands.40 Such opinions led to the focus on self-sufficiency, as 
military officials implemented contract labor programs that required contrabands to work for 
wages, and that only those who worked would receive assistance from the government.41  
Furthermore, any assistance would only be temporary to avoid the specter of permanent 
dependency, and many officials truly believed that such strict measures helped the contrabands 
learn how to survive in a free labor economy.42   However, they failed to realize the scale of the 
poverty and destitution amongst the contrabands, and even made it worse by failing to pay wages 
and then refusing to provide assistance, clearly indicating how the idea of self-sufficiency 
became devastating for the contrabands.43  Furthermore, according to Gerteis, emancipation 
worsened northern racism, as many white Northerners opposed a war they perceived as being 
fought solely for emancipation and rights for African-Americans, which only worsened the 
situation for the contrabands.44   
Such racist attitudes also appeared in the “free-labor” ideology that did not provide a full 
freedom for contraband laborers in the South. The free-labor ideology prominent in antebellum 
America contributed to an emphasis on contraband labor at the expense of humane treatment.  
According to Eric Foner, the free labor ideology stated that all Northern men could become 
economically autonomous through hard work and that any worker could become an independent 
                                                          
39 Rose, Rehearsal for Reconstruction, 158.  
40 Ibid, 140.  
41 Berlin, ed., Freedom: The Upper South, 15.  
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid, 23.  
44 Gerteis, From Contraband to Freedman, 6.  
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property owner.45  In reality, the idea of free labor failed to eliminate major inequity in labor 
relations and employers had complete control.46  Such ideas became part of federal contraband 
policy, as “Republicans viewed the transition from slavery to freedom through the prism of free 
labor” and only saw the contrabands becoming wage laborers on plantations rather than 
independent proprietors or land owners.47  Contraband policy, therefore, focused on proving the 
effectiveness of free labor rather than improving conditions in the camps.  Contrabands were 
made to either work for the government or, in South Carolina, work on farms run by lessees, and 
both parties failed to provide even basics such as food and shelter or even the right to leave an 
abusive employer.48  The free labor ideology, combined with the failure of federal policymakers 
to regulate treatment of contrabands once they reached Union lines, led to abysmal conditions in 
all three regions despite the differences among them.  Such mistreatment of contraband laborers 
began during the first summer of the war at a remote outpost on the Virginia Peninsula 
commanded by a political general named Benjamin Butler. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
45 Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), ix.  
46 Ibid, xvi, xxii.  
47 Ibid, xxxii. 
48 Ira Berlin, Steven F. Miller, Joseph P. Reidy, Leslie S. Rowland, Julie Saville, ed. Freedom: A Documentary History 
of Emancipation 1861-1867, Selected from the Holdings of the National Archives of the United States Series I, 
Volume III, The Wartime Genesis of Free Labor: The Lower South (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
22-23; Lt. Col. Edward W. Smith to Messrs. Brisbane, Wording, and Smith, 25 February 1864, in Freedom, The 
Lower South, ed. Berlin et al, 295.  
 
 
12 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER I  
HAMPTON ROADS, VIRGINIA 
 
In the summer of 1861, Union troops held Fortress Monroe, located at the tip of the 
Virginia Peninsula outside Hampton, but held no territory beyond the fort.49  To prevent the 
Union occupiers from utilizing the resources in the city, Confederate troops burned Hampton and 
fled, giving hundreds of slaves the opportunity to flee to freedom.50  At this early stage of the 
war, however, the reaction of Union troops to the new arrivals was far from certain.  
At this time, Union soldiers and policymakers were unsure whether to even accept 
fugitives into the lines, much less how to treat them once they arrived. In Hampton, however, 
slaves were forced to work under brutal conditions on Confederate fortifications within sight of 
Union-held Fortress Monroe.  These slaves began to hear rumors that they “would be taken 
south” for further military labor and decided to gamble and flee to the Union bastion.51  Frank 
Baker, James Townsend, and Sheppard Mallory became the first fugitive slaves to reach Fort 
Monroe.  The three men offered to work for the Union Army in exchange for protection.  
General Benjamin Butler, who was in “great need of labor in [his] quartermaster’s department,” 
agreed.  He justified his actions as taking “property designed, adapted, and about to be used 
                                                          
49 Berlin, ed., Freedom: The Upper South, 87.  
50 Ibid. 
51 “General Butler’s Contrabands,” in The Civil War Archive: The History of the Civil War in Documents, ed. Henry 
Steele Commager and Rev. Erik Brown (New York: Black Dog and Leventhal Publishers, 2000), 568; J. Michael Cobb, 
“Rehearsing Reconstruction in Occupied Virginia: Life and Emancipation at Fort Monroe,” in Virginia at War: 1864, 
ed. William C. Davis and James I. Robertson, Jr. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2009), 140.  
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against the United States” away from the enemy, which led to the term “contraband of war,” 
meaning enemy military property liable to seizure by Union forces.52  In addition, Butler stated 
that the Fugitive Slave Act did not apply to a foreign country, so masters could not reclaim their 
slaves from the fort.53  President Lincoln ordered Butler not to return any fugitives, even women 
and children who were perceived to not work in order to prevent the separation of families, 
which resolved the issue of whether to accept contrabands but failed to provide any guidance on 
how they should be treated.54   
Once the first three contrabands gained protection at Fort Monroe, more and more began 
arriving until hundreds had sought shelter behind Union lines, making the question of their 
treatment imperative.55  Butler ordered Edward Pierce to “organize the contrabands into a labor 
force” to work for the military in the “engineer, ordinance, quartermaster, commissary, and 
medical departments.”56  He divided the laborers into first and second class based on ability to 
work, and designated wages of ten dollars a month for first class hands and 5 dollars a month for 
second class, along with rations and clothing.  The contrabands, however, only saw one or two 
dollars a month, due to deductions for clothing costs and a fund to support dependent 
contrabands who could not work.57  Furthermore, any contraband who was sick for six days in a 
row or more than ten in a month lost half wages for the month.58  Despite these deductions in 
their wages, Edward F. Pierce, the superintendent of contrabands at the Fort, stated, “They would 
be required to do only such labor as we ourselves had done… they would be treated kindly, and 
                                                          
52 Benjamin Butler to Winfield Scott, 24 May 1861, in The Civil War: The First Year Told by Those Who Lived It, ed. 
Brooks D. Simpson, Stephen W. Sears, and Aaron Sheehan –Dean (New York: Penguin, 2011), 361-362.  
53 Brasher, The Peninsula Campaign, 35.  
54 Oakes, Freedom National, 99-100.  
55 Berlin, ed., Freedom: The Upper South, 87.  
56 General Orders No. 34, in Freedom: The Upper South, ed. Berlin, et al, 111.  
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid.  
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no one should be obliged to work beyond his capacity… and that they should be furnished… 
with full soldiers’ rations.”59  His assertions would prove hollow, however, as contrabands in 
Hampton were abused, mistreated, and denied even these rudimentary wages by army officers.  
The conditions became so abysmal that one minister termed the program “government slavery” 
and the federal authorities in Washington did nothing to stop it.60 
One of the major reasons for mistreatment of contrabands at Fortress Monroe was the 
indifference or outright hostility of army officers placed in charge of contraband labor.  One 
observer stated, “what do government officers generally care how they treat these poor waifs, 
who have been cast up on their heartless protection?”61 Soldiers and officers had signed up to 
fight the rebels rather than take care of contrabands, and many saw the contrabands as a 
“nuisance” and resented the new assignment.62  According to historian Henry L. Swint, “To 
many members of the Federal armies… the plight of the freedmen seemed hardly less distressing 
than that of the slave,” and such attitudes were common at Fort Monroe and the larger Hampton 
Roads region as well.63  Even worse, many officers saw contrabands as “incompetent [and] unfit 
to determine their own best interests,” and used these racist views to justify mistreatment and 
abuse.64  Such attitudes, present under Butler’s regime, became even worse when General Wool 
took over in late 1861, replacing Butler’s relatively abolitionist soldiers, whose experience led to 
their transfer to the front, with troops much more hostile to the contrabands.  These soldiers, 
according to historian Robert F. Engs, “struck upon a system of treatment that was hardly 
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distinguishable from the slavery blacks were seeking to escape” and denied the contrabands 
wages, rations, clothing, and even freedom from the corporal punishment they thought they had 
left behind in slavery.65  
Throughout 1861 and 1862, the army failed to pay contrabands wages for government 
labor.  The army required all the contrabands who were able to work or “starve,” but then failed 
to pay the wages needed for the contrabands to survive.66  Army officials, especially General 
Wool, justified this exploitation by claiming that wages went to a fund for dependents but often 
failed to even pay the two dollar wages still owed the contrabands after deductions for the fund.67  
Furthermore, by January 1862, the fund contained seven thousand dollars, more than enough to 
support the dependent contrabands, but wages were not increased for workers.68  Ideas of 
dependence contributed to such actions by military officials, as many believed that contrabands 
had to be forced to work and “improve themselves” rather than rely on government handouts.69 
Many officials, in fact, believed that contrabands would not work without proper guardianship, 
and a mandatory wage labor system would be necessary to prevent idleness and permanent 
dependence.70  According to historian Ira Berlin, many officers believed that contrabands- once 
freed, educated, and taught Christianity- would profit from freedom alone without the need for 
wages.71  Contrabands who protested the lack of wages through work stoppages were “jailed and 
whipped” until they returned to work, despite the destitution of their families, indicating the clear 
                                                          
65 Ibid, 21.  
66 Major Wm. P. Jones to Maj. John A. Dix, 5 June 1862, in Freedom: The Upper South, ed. Berlin, et al, 126.  
67 Berlin, Freedom: The Upper South, 88.  
68 Ibid.  
69 Ibid, 88-89; Report from Col. T.J. Cram, LeG B. Cannon, and William P. Jones, 1862, in Freedom, The Upper South, 
ed. Berlin, et al, 113.  
70 Gerteis, From Contraband to Freedman, 34-35.  
71 Report from Col. T. J. Cram, LeG B. Cannon, and William P. Jones, 1862, in Freedom, The Upper South, ed. Berlin, 
et al, 113.  
 
 
16 
 
priority of instituting free labor and avoiding dependence at the expense of contraband welfare.72  
The most egregious reason for failure to pay wages, corruption, also became prevalent in 
Hampton.  Officers cheated contrabands out of wages and even sold clothing and rations to make 
money for themselves at the expense of the contrabands.73  For all these reasons, military 
officials owed ten thousand dollars in back wages by the end of 1862, with devastating 
consequences for the contrabands.74 
Many contrabands protested to army authorities to gain the wages justly due them.  
Suthey Parker worked in the quartermaster department for two months and then as a military 
cook for ten months during 1862, but only received fifteen dollars total for a year of work, and 
was still trying to gain his back wages in September 1865.75  Contrabands working in the 
Engineer’s Department, meanwhile, reported their complaints to Minister Lewis Lockwood, who 
wrote to a United States senator seeking redress but to no avail, indicating the negligence of the 
highest government authorities in stopping the abuse of contrabands.  Lockwood described 
contrabands who only received one dollar and “inadequate” clothing for six months of work 
despite the seven thousand dollars in the fund for dependents.76  In another revealing letter, 
Orlando Brown, the superintendent of contrabands in Newport News, just northwest of Hampton 
on the Virginia Peninsula, states that one hundred contrabands working in the hospital had never 
received any pay, and that only thirty out of more than one hundred contrabands working for the 
quartermaster had received pay, indicating that military officials knew of the problem but took 
no action to remedy it, as Brown does not include any evidence of giving the contrabands back 
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pay.77  Brown’s superior officer, Major General Dix, reported to the Secretary of War, citing 
several complaints from unnamed contrabands, that they did not receive any pay until November 
1861 due to the lack of a payroll system and that the army owed over thirty thousand dollars to 
the contrabands.  He does not indicate any plan to institute payments, and Berlin states that 
payments did not begin until late 1863.78  Even more telling, white laborers were paid regular 
wages of one dollar a day while contrabands received irregular if no wages, revealing the racism 
of army authorities and their exploitation of contrabands.79  Even worse for the contrabands, a 
lack of wages was not the only hardship they faced, as corporal punishment, disease, and a lack 
of rations combined to produce unbearable conditions at the Fort.  
Late in 1862, C.B. Wilder, superintendent of contrabands, wrote, “As the colored people 
increase in numbers, so [did] the hostility to them.” Mistreatment by the army only became 
worse as the year went on.80  Many contrabands died of disease due to lack of adequate rations, 
clothing, or shelter, and military authorities did little to address the problem.  In winter 1862, 
“thousands of blacks were left without food, clothing, or the means to purchase firewood” during 
the harsh weather, contributing to a mortality rate of four to six a day.81  As Engs writes, 
“Freedmen were frequently mistreated by their emancipators and many died as a result of army 
neglect” and abuse.82  Even worse, many officers and soldiers still used corporal punishment on 
the contrabands despite earlier promises of humane and decent treatment.83  In his letter, 
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Lockwood not only cites whipping as a punishment for protest but also states that contrabands 
“have been knocked down senseless with shovels and clubs” by soldiers and officers, 
demonstrating the degree to which the army tolerated abuse of contrabands.84  Historian Robert 
F. Engs further describes the physical abuse of contrabands by racist soldiers and officers, also 
revealing the scale of mistreatment.  In a final example of exploitation during this period, 
Superintendent Wilder evicted one hundred contrabands, many of them women and children, 
from their home in Hampton to house a brigade of soldiers, and gave them land in Hampton, but 
also denied them any further government support and ordered them to “take care of themselves” 
in the city.85 Wilder’s focus on minimizing expenses rather than treating the contrabands 
humanely exemplifies the conditions faced by contrabands in Virginia in 1861 and 1862, which 
even led some to return voluntarily to their former masters rather than continue to live under a 
system of “government slavery” that was no better than the true slavery they had escaped, due to 
a lack of wages, squalid camps, continued corporal punishment, and persistent poverty.86  
Unfortunately for the contrabands, the arrival of McClellan’s Army of the Potomac for the 
Peninsula Campaign would only worsen the situation. 
During the Peninsula Campaign in summer 1862, General George McClellan and the 
Army of the Potomac advanced up the Peninsula towards Richmond, and came within miles of 
the capital before being repulsed by Confederate forces.87  While all the soldiers were white, 
contrabands still played key roles in the Union war effort, but were not rewarded with even 
decent treatment.  As Berlin writes, “The freedpeople quickly made themselves indispensable to 
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the Northern war effort,” but the Union army failed to properly compensate them, which led to 
“hardship for workers and their dependents.”88  Contrabands gathered vital intelligence for 
Union forces, worked on fortifications and performed other military labor for both the Army and 
the Navy, which as Glenn David Brasher argues, played a significant role in early Northern 
success during the campaign and also “helped prepare Northerners to accept emancipation as a 
military necessity.”89  While it may have helped increase support for emancipation, the campaign 
failed to improve conditions for contrabands, which only worsened as the labor needs of the 
military increased. 
General McClellan, the Union commander, held decidedly proslavery views, and such 
ideas remained prevalent in his army, much to the detriment of the contrabands.  As 
Superintendent of Contrabands Wilder reported, after the arrival of McClellan’s army, “The 
abuses… are continued, and in many cases… with increased rigor, by Rebel sympathizers, 
straggling Soldiers, and Governmental Officers.”90  According to Brasher, soldiers “stole from 
African-Americans, physically abused slave children, and sometimes raped enslaved women” 
during their march up the Peninsula.91  Even officers sold rations, evicted contrabands from 
homes for army use, and returned fugitives to the rebels despite a clear Article of War passed by 
Congress banning the army from returning fugitive slaves.92  Some officers, according to Berlin, 
even took bribes from Unionist slaveholders to “uphold slave discipline” and even “serve as 
slave catchers, in defiance of federal law,” indicating that some army personnel would even 
resort to illegal activity to exploit contrabands.93  Furthermore, soldiers “engaged in repeated 
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rampages of pillaging, looting, and rape in freedmen’s settlements” and stole crops from 
contrabands who were attempting to make an independent living on abandoned land around 
Hampton.94  Edward Whitehurst, for example, cultivated eighteen acres and stated that Union 
troops took his crops, livestock, potatoes, and even flour, and did not give him any monetary 
compensation.95  Such depredations made the contrabands afraid to start farms, and increased 
dependence on military labor, leading to even further exploitation by army authorities, as the 
treatment of those working for the army did not improve despite urgent military necessity.96   
Contrabands working for the army performed tasks ranging from unloading transport 
ships to scouting to camp servants.  However, they often failed to receive full wages, and some 
were not paid at all for weeks or months of difficult labor in the harsh Virginia summer.97  When 
not enough contrabands volunteered for military labor, army authorities impressed squads of 
contrabands without regard for the impact on their families and dependents.98  These forced 
laborers did not receive any higher wages than voluntary workers and often were not paid 
regularly if at all, increasing the hardship for their families.99  When enough labor could not be 
found even by impressing local contrabands, authorities in Washington, D.C. forced large squads 
of contrabands to go to the Peninsula and work for McClellan’s army, leaving their families 
behind in the squalid camps of the capital.100  The Peninsula Campaign, therefore, resulted not 
only in a Union defeat but also, according to Engs, “proved devastating for army-black 
relations,” as soldiers abused, impressed, failed to pay, and even stole from contrabands, all in 
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the name of “military necessity.”101  The “brutal” treatment of contrabands by Union soldiers 
would have even worse consequences after the campaign, as Dix, in an attempt to keep the 
contrabands away from Union camps, placed them on Craney Island, off the coast of Hampton 
and far from any troops.102  The conditions on the island, however, belied any benevolent 
intentions, as poverty, disease, and death dominated the contrabands’ brief stay. 
In November 1862, Major General John Dix, commander at Fort Monroe, ordered the 
contrabands moved to Craney Island to make room for additional Union troops at the fort.  
However, he did not give any consideration to the wishes of the contrabands or the fact that 
many had steady government jobs at the Fort and, according to missionary Lucy Chase, viewed 
the island as a “slave-pen.”103  The authorities, however, did not plan for the move, and the 
contrabands, according to Dix, were “forced to remain all night on the wharf without shelter 
and… food” and were “suffering with disease” due to exposure to the elements, and several 
contrabands died from illness.104  In addition, Union soldiers took advantage of the situation and 
robbed the already suffering contrabands of what few possessions they had.105  Some soldiers 
even physically beat the contrabands to force them onto the transport ships despite their 
weakened state from two days waiting on the docks.  Soldiers and army authorities treated the 
contrabands so badly during the move, according to Gerteis, that some contrabands ran away due 
to fear of re-enslavement.106  The bad conditions on the move, according to abolitionist observer 
F.W. Bird, contributed to high rates of disease on the island, causing many contrabands to be 
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unable to support themselves.107  For the contrabands who survived the brutal mistreatment 
during the move, conditions on Craney Island would only deteriorate further during the ten 
months they spent on the disease-ridden island. 
By January 1863, more than two thousand contrabands lived on the desperately 
overcrowded island, and shortages of everything from food to clothing to wages remained 
constant for the remainder of the year.108 Chase reported nine hundred contrabands without 
clothing, and new arrivals overwhelmed the efforts of missionaries to distribute clothing and 
supplies.109  In addition, she describes children who had almost no clothing and a lack of shoes, 
which forced her to “send sick and shivering women home” without adequate clothing or 
footwear.110  The clothing shortage, furthermore, prevented many contrabands from working in 
the fields to support themselves, which only worsened their poverty, especially since Dix and the 
military authorities expected the contrabands to support themselves and not rely on government 
charity.111  In addition to a lack of clothing, furthermore, the army failed to provide adequate 
rations for the contrabands, further contributing to suffering and disease.  As Chase wrote, “The 
well on the Island were suffering for food, and we had nothing with which to tempt the 
convalescing,” indicating the scale of the food shortages.112  Even worse, the paymaster, 
Lieutenant Sykes, fled the island without paying any wages in September 1863, and Dix still 
expected the contrabands to support themselves.113   The lack of clothing and food, along with a 
continued lack of regular wages, caused “desperate poverty” on the island, especially after able-
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bodied men left for military work in 1863, leaving only women and children on the island with 
no way to support themselves.114  For the contrabands, the failure of the army to provide even 
basic supplies would have even more horrendous consequences, as disease and mortality rates 
soared. 
During the contrabands’ ten-month stay on Craney Island, “hundreds sickened and died” 
from disease caused by exposure to harsh, “cutting” winds, and the aforementioned lack of basic 
supplies.115  According to Gerteis, disease remained “rampant” during the entire period, and 
army authorities did almost nothing to address the problem, clearly indicating the scale of 
military, neglect, mistreatment and abuse of contrabands in the Hampton Roads area.116  
According to Chase, two to three contrabands died a day, and “consumption” remained 
“prevalent” throughout the year.117  Furthermore, even when the army did issue rations to 
contrabands, “the necessary exposure to which our half-clad people were subjected, when going 
for rations… brings coughs and colds into every barrack,” demonstrating that army authorities 
directly contributed to the high rates of disease.118  By the end of the contrabands’ stay at Craney 
Island, rats plagued every barracks building and disease rates had never abated, proving that 
army authorities did little to improve conditions in nearly a year supervising the island.  By 
September 1863, however, even army authorities began to seek a more permanent solution for 
the contrabands, although they focused more on free labor and having the contrabands support 
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themselves rather than truly improving conditions, and these motivations led to the decision to 
institute government farms.119 
At the same time that thousands of contrabands were suffering from disease and 
shortages of basic supplies, hundreds faced the same conditions in Yorktown, a few miles farther 
north on the Peninsula.  At a settlement called “Slabtown,” which consisted of “dilapidated sheds 
and barns,” shortages of everything from housing to food to clothing contributed to appalling 
conditions.120  Most of these contrabands were dependents of soldiers in the United States 
Colored Troops who had no way to support themselves and relied on government rations.  
However, according to Engs, out of ten thousand contrabands, army authorities only provided 
5,401 rations, leaving nearly half to face starvation.121  The awful conditions, furthermore, led to 
“frequent deaths from disease, exposure, and hunger,” further indicating the scale of military 
mistreatment of contrabands across Hampton Roads.122  These contrabands would also 
eventually be settled on government farms, but not before army neglect and mistreatment had 
taken a horrific toll.  
Before the contrabands could settle on government farms, they had to be moved off of 
Craney Island, and the army mistreated them just as much on this move as when they arrived on 
the island.  They were banned from taking any crops they had managed to grow on the island and 
army authorities refused to issue rations, meaning that the contrabands went without food for the 
duration of the move.123  Furthermore, the contrabands had only been issued half rations for the 
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period prior to the move despite hard labor demolishing the barracks.124  The contrabands’ tenure 
on Craney Island, therefore, was marked by exploitation, abuse, disease, and death from arrival 
to departure.  Army authorities claimed that government farms would be a significant 
improvement, but the exploitation and mistreatment only continued. 
In making the decision to set up the farms, General Dix focused on removing the 
contrabands from government support and placing them far away from the army, with the idea of 
having farm superintendents supervise their labor and thus freeing army officers of the 
burdensome task.125  Large amounts of abandoned land were available since most of the whites 
in the area had fled in 1861, making the decision easier.126  Major General Butler approved this 
program in early 1864, and contrabands were assigned to farms to begin planting that spring.127  
However, rather than helping the contrabands, the army focused on free labor and “self-
sufficiency” on the farms.  Military officials thought they were teaching contrabands to be self-
reliant and independent, but failed to account for the desperate poverty amongst them and the 
very clear need for assistance.128  As Captain Orlando Brown, the superintendent of contrabands 
in Norfolk, wrote, the goal of the farm program was “to leave them as far as possible to their 
own resources [and] to teach them that freedom from slavery is not freedom from labor.”129  In 
fact, army authorities took the doctrine of self-reliance and free labor so far that they forced 
contrabands, even the families of soldiers in the United States Colored Troops, to move to 
government farms by cutting off their rations until they complied, with no regard to the desires 
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of the contrabands.130  In addition, authorities in Yorktown evicted oystermen, peddlers, and 
squatters out of their houses to make room for farm workers, even though many of these 
contrabands had legitimate jobs.131  Once the army settled contrabands on the farms, either 
voluntarily or by force, the exploitation continued, as military authorities continued to focus on 
free labor at the expense of contraband rights.  In addition, they wanted to maintain a 
“traditional” economy with as little disruption to the area as possible, and believed that only 
contrabands who worked on government farms could become self-sufficient.132 
Despite the fact that the army controlled Fort Monroe and most of the surrounding area, 
and claims by army officials that farms were only set up in “secure areas,” the government farms 
still faced attacks from guerrillas and rebel sympathizers, leaving the contrabands vulnerable to 
re-enslavement or worse.133  The area, according to Berlin, remained plagued with “die-hard 
rebels determined to prevent former slaves from engaging in any form of free labor” and army 
authorities failed to provide sufficient protection to the contrabands, with horrific results.134  
According to Engs, Confederate guerrillas did capture several contrabands from government 
farms and sold them back into slavery, clearly showing the scale of army neglect of contraband 
rights, as military authorities failed to protect even their freedom from slavery.135  The problem 
became so bad in Norfolk that authorities had to form a company of contrabands for defense 
when the army refused to spare any soldiers to protect contraband farms.136  When the army 
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leased plantations to private businessmen, the problem only became worse, as military 
authorities placed contrabands onto plantations run by lessees but failed to provide protection, 
despite clear evidence of the guerrilla threat.  One rebel sympathizer who had abandoned his land 
early in the war returned to the area to find it leased by the federal government.  He retaliated by 
viciously assaulting lessees and contraband workers.  The army, despite the presence of 
thousands of troops, did little to stop him and other guerrillas that plagued the farms throughout 
the war, clearly indicating the devastating consequences the army’s focus on free labor at the 
expense of the rights and welfare of the contrabands.137  For the contrabands who escaped 
guerrilla attacks, however, conditions were little better, as military officials repeatedly cut rations 
and wages in order to ensure contrabands did not become dependent on the government, but with 
little regard to the continuing poverty and destitution. 
The system of contraband farms was clearly set up to ensure that the contrabands worked 
rather than to protect their rights.  Each family worked a ten acre farm for half the crop, but the 
army also created a gang labor system and even “put a lien on the crops to ensure the payment of 
debts,” including rent, clearly revealing the importance of ideas of self-sufficiency and free 
labor.138  Since the first food crop would not be harvested until the fall, the army stated that it 
would issue rations to the contrabands until the crop became available for subsistence.139  
Aversion to contraband dependence and reliance on government charity, however, caused 
numerous instances of army officials reducing or even cutting rations on the farms.  
Superintendent Brown, for example, decided that the legal ration for contraband farm workers 
“was considerable greater than… necessary for their actual support” and cut rations in order to 
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save money without regard to the impact on contraband workers.140 Even worse, when a drought 
devastated the 1863 crop, Brown refused to increase rations, and spent over eighty thousand 
dollars less than permitted on contraband rations, in order to “leave them as far as possible to 
their own resources” and avoid supposed dependence on government charity, even though 
unforeseen events, not a failure to work hard, had devastated the crop and left the contrabands 
without sufficient subsistence.141  While the situation dramatically improved in 1864, as good 
weather produced a bountiful harvest that easily provided enough subsistence for the 
contrabands, the army still enforced rent charges and even charged for livestock fodder, clearly 
demonstrating the importance of self-reliance.142  In perhaps the most telling indication of the 
true motivations behind government farms, the army made twenty thousand dollars in profits 
from the farms in 1864 alone, while cutting rations and charging contrabands for rent and 
fodder.143  While the contrabands eventually provided their own subsistence, army officials still 
mistreated and exploited them, especially during the crop failure in 1863. 
For contrabands both on and off the government farms, financial exploitation by the army 
was not the only worry.  Union soldiers and officers routinely physically abused contrabands and 
suffered almost no retaliation from superiors.  According to Gerteis, “northern soldiers generally 
found a crude amusement in the harassment of contrabands,” and such abuse continued 
throughout the war, long after McClellan’s army departed the Peninsula.144  Soldiers even 
attacked contrabands working on farms, stole crops and livestock, and generally hampered the 
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ability of the contrabands to support themselves.145  In Newport News, meanwhile, soldiers 
desecrated the only black church in the area, which also served as a school for one hundred 
children, ripping out floorboards, siding windows, pews, and sacred objects.  No record exists of 
these soldiers being disciplined.146  The soldiers at Fort Monroe did not behave any better, as the 
contrabands there were “abused and maimed, by the brutality of those under whom they work” 
and “were treated very roughly.”147  Such physical abuse, combined with a continued lack of 
wages, meant, according to New York missionaries, that the contrabands were “worse off than 
they were in slavery,” and some even wanted to return to their owners.148  These ideas came 
from the fact that contrabands and white officials had vastly different ideas of freedom.  While 
military officials, according to Engs, wanted to “control” rather than help contrabands, and 
therefore focused on self-sufficiency, avoiding dependence, and the war effort, contrabands had 
other ideas.149  They believed that freedom would mean decent treatment, wages for their work, 
and the end of impressment and separation of families, which they saw as a relic of slavery.  To 
the contrabands, unpaid labor and impressment seemed too similar to the slavery they thought 
they had escaped, and so did corporal punishment and abuse by Union troops.150 
Contraband women suffered even more, as the threat of rape by Union soldiers never 
went away.  In Yorktown, several soldiers raped a young girl, prompting male contrabands to kill 
the soldiers, establishing both the sheer depravity soldiers were capable of and the ability of 
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contrabands to fight for their rights and their basic dignity as human beings.151  According to 
historian Leon Litwack, such sexual violence against contrabands remained commonplace 
throughout the war, and he cites two disturbing cases of violent sexual assaults in Hampton.152  
These assaults clearly indicate the scale of army mistreatment and abuse of contrabands, as racist 
soldiers beat and exploited contrabands with little fear of repercussions.153  As Litwack states, 
contrabands were “apt to encounter the same prejudices, the same exploitation… and the same 
capacity for sadistic cruelty” as they had in slavery.154  Furthermore, most soldiers remained 
“reluctant liberators” at best and did not see contraband rights as a significant army objective.155  
Common soldiers, therefore, exploited and abused contrabands, and officers and higher 
authorities did little to stop it.  Even for contrabands who escaped physical abuse, another threat 
loomed, as army officers desperate for labor began to impress contrabands into labor gangs by 
force. 
In December 1863, Butler issued an order regulating the labor of contrabands, and, in 
particular, the practice of impressment that had been persistent since the Peninsula Campaign.  
He stated that men aged eighteen to forty five had to enlist if fit for service, and that government 
laborers would not be provided rations for themselves or their families and had to become self-
reliant.156  However, he also attempted to stop the practice of impressment, stating that “no 
officer or soldier shall impress or force to labor for any private purpose whatever, any negro” 
and ordered that any impressed laborers had to be given rations.157  The government had to 
                                                          
151 Ibid, 60.  
152 Litwack, Been in the Storm So Long, 130.  
153 Ibid, 125.  
154 Ibid, 128.  
155 Ibid, 127.  
156 General Orders No. 46, 5 December 1863, in Freedom: The Upper South, ed. Berlin, et al, 169-170. 
157 Ibid, 170.  
 
 
31 
 
ensure that impressment only occurred due to “military necessity” and that impressed workers 
received humane treatment and proper wages and rations.158  The order, however, failed to stem 
the abusive practices of impressment in the region, as labor recruiters continued to force 
contrabands to perform hard labor without regard to the consequences for both their rights and 
the welfare of their families who depended on their wages, which often failed to come, leaving 
them destitute.159 
Numerous instances exist of contrabands being impressed for military labor.  During the 
latter stages of the contrabands’ tenure on Craney Island, labor recruiters promised contrabands 
their “long overdue wages” if they boarded a ship to see the paymaster, but the ship took them to 
Washington for unpaid labor on the fortifications instead, clearly indicating the base exploitation 
of contrabands by military authorities.160  Around the same time in Norfolk, soldiers removed 
contrabands from their homes and even from church and forced them to board a ship for 
Washington, even though they still had not received any pay for several months of work at 
Norfolk.161  John Jordan, for example, received only eighty six cents for a year’s labor, while 
William P. Johnson had not been paid at all in two years.  Furthermore, soldiers impressed 
contrabands such as Nelson Sprewell who were clearly unfit for hard labor.162  While these 
incidents occurred prior to the issuance of the order, it did little to improve the situation for 
contrabands, as the practice of impressment continued unabated. 
In May 1864, despite the order prohibiting impressment except for urgent military 
necessity, Brigadier General Shepley ordered the impressment of workers for the fortifications at 
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Norfolk, and captured forty-five contrabands along with over one hundred women and children, 
who he moved to Norfolk with their husbands.  While he promised twenty dollars a month and 
rations for the laborers, he failed to provide rations for families, and no record exists of whether 
he actually paid the wages promised.163  One officer, Lieutenant Colonel Frank J. White, even 
impressed free blacks in addition to contrabands and placed workers in “a worst Bondage than 
the slaves ever was,” according to a Virginia Unionist observer.164  As Captain Wilder, the 
Superintendent of Contrabands, wrote in an observation of the practice in general, “How unjust 
that they must stay here, after a long absence from home, and be impressed… often without a 
cent for expenses, or but barely enough to get them home, without being paid off.”165  His 
assessment accurately describes impressment for military labor, as army authorities focused on 
the war effort and claiming military necessity forced contrabands to perform hard labor while 
failing to provide rations or the wages needed to support their families, resulting in destitution 
and poverty for the women and children left behind.166  While labor recruiters mistreated 
contrabands, however, the most brutal form of impressment was practiced by recruiters for the 
United States Colored Troops. 
Beginning in late 1863, military impressment “separated hundreds of black men from 
their families and sent them to the battle front,” where difficult labor and hard fighting took a 
terrible toll.167  As Engs writes, “men were dragged away to army encampments and ordered to 
enlist” and faced brutal punishments if they resisted.168  Numerous contrabands testified to an 
army court of inquiry describing the harsh tactics used by recruiters.  James Holsten, for 
                                                          
163 Capt. O. Brown to Lt. Col. J. B. Kinsman, 12 May 1864, in Freedom: The Upper South, ed. Berlin, et al, 191-192.  
164 B.L. Parrish to Hon. Mr. Stanton, 16 January 1865, in Freedom: The Upper South, ed. Berlin, et al, 219.  
165 Capt. C.B. Wilder to Lt. Col. Laws H. Pelouze, 8 August 1863, in Freedom: The Upper South, ed. Berlin, et al, 160.  
166 Berlin, ed., Freedom: The Upper South, 99.  
167 Ibid, 104.  
168 Engs, Freedom’s First Generation, 30.  
 
 
33 
 
example, stated that recruiters confined him to the guardhouse when he refused to enlist, despite 
disabilities that clearly rendered him unfit for service.169  Mills Burton and James Colden, 
meanwhile, despite having families that depended on the wages from their government jobs, also 
were confined in the guardhouse until they gave in and enlisted.170  Recruiters even forced 
fourteen-year-old Benjamin Crumpler and forty-three-year-old John Bond to enlist despite the 
fact that neither was of military age.171  Recruiters also took advantage of the illiteracy of the 
contrabands by forcing them to leave their mark on enlistment documents they clearly did not 
understand, indicating clear exploitation of contrabands even by members of black regiments.172  
The worst cases of military impressment, however, involved punishments sadistic enough to be 
seen as torture used to force contrabands to give in and enlist.  According to Engs, many 
recruiters placed contrabands in jail with a ball and chain until they enlisted.173  William Carney, 
for example, refused to enlist and recruiters locked him in the guardhouse, denied him food and 
water, and forced him to carry heavy, fifty-pound balls continuously until he enlisted, and then 
punished him again for failure to “properly” take the enlistment oath.174   
Such practices clearly demonstrate how brutally military recruiters could exploit and 
abuse contrabands to fill the ranks, without regard to the fact that contrabands often had families 
dependent on their wages or disabilities that prevented them from serving in the first place.  As 
Engs writes, “Impressment was final proof that not even emancipation and black participation in 
the war effort could change army attitudes” and demonstrated the “army’s unwillingness to care 
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for the freedmen or do the job with any degree of goodwill.”175  Impressment, therefore, whether 
for military labor or army service, exemplifies military mistreatment of contrabands and federal 
inability to prevent it, as no one in Washington stepped in to stop the brutal practice of 
impressment in Virginia.  While contrabands caught in the net of impressment suffered greatly 
during this period, their families in the camps fared little better, as they faced disease, poverty, 
and high mortality, and army authorities focused on avoiding dependence on the government, 
despite clear evidence of need.  
By late 1864, no more abandoned land remained available, meaning that contrabands, 
mostly the dependents of men working for the government, had to live in squalid camps in 
desperate poverty.176  In one camp, twelve contrabands lived in a one room house, and several 
homes at a camp near Downey Plantation were “unfit for human habitation.”177  The 
contrabands, according to New York missionaries, “presented a miserable appearance” due to a 
lack of clothing and rations.178  As Engs wrote, in 1864 and 1865, “much destitution and hunger” 
occurred in the contraband camps, and also led to disease and higher mortality rates.179  
Smallpox and yellow fever, along with numerous other diseases, took a “frightful toll” and 
medical authorities did little to improve conditions.180  Even in an orphanage, a shortage of 
vegetables caused fifty-one preventable cases of scurvy, indicating the degree of medical neglect 
of the contrabands.181  A school superintendent working for the American Missionary 
Association referenced mortality rates of four to five a day and stated, “With a virulent disease 
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raging in our midst, we find these means insufficient to save them from absolute suffering.”182  
Despite the clear evidence of horrendous conditions in the camps, however, military authorities 
focused more on ensuring that the contrabands all had jobs and remained self-sufficient and did 
little to address the overcrowding, disease, and poverty in the camps, even as contrabands 
determined to escape slavery and achieve freedom no matter what the obstacles continued 
arriving at Union lines.183 
According to Berlin, “attempts to alleviate destitution ran afoul of efforts to conserve 
scarce resources and reduce expenditures,” indicating that military authorities emphasized the 
need to save money, with devastating consequences for the contrabands.184  Furthermore, 
authorities focused on avoiding dependence and making the contrabands self-sufficient, resulting 
in wage and ration cuts that the contrabands could not afford.  Only families of soldiers and those 
clearly unable to work could get government rations, and the commissary officer spent over 
eighty thousand dollars less than permitted on contraband rations, clearly demonstrating the 
importance of economy rather than contraband welfare.185  In Norfolk, Orlando Brown, the 
Superintendent of Contrabands, decided that the contraband ration allowed by army regulations 
was too expensive and cut it almost in half in order to save money, but made no mention of the 
impact on the already impoverished contrabands.186  Even worse, commissary officers began 
charging contrabands five cents per ration, even for the dependents of soldiers who had been 
promised government sustenance, and refused to issue rations to those who could not pay unless 
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they were truly “helpless,” revealing the degree of exploitation of contrabands in the name of 
self-reliance.187 
In addition to cutting rations, army authorities also failed to pay contrabands their wages 
for government labor, continuing an exploitative practice that persisted throughout the war.  One 
quartermaster failed to properly audit the payroll records for contrabands working in his 
department, which resulted in their wages being denied, even though the army owed them four 
months of back pay.188  According to Engs, contrabands “rarely” received the “just wages” due 
them for government labor, and the army often owed them several months of back pay.189  
Abraham Cannaday, for example, worked at a government sawmill for over a year and failed to 
receive any wages.  He stated, “I have not recevd a cent of money and my famley is aseffring for 
the sorport of my labor,” indicating both the degree of army exploitation of contraband labor and 
the efforts by contrabands to protest for their basic rights.190  No record exists of army authorities 
granting him the wages clearly owed him, even as the war came to an end.  In addition, “many of 
the black workers employed at Fortress Monroe in the first months of the war were still trying to 
collect their pay at its end,” demonstrating that army authorities failed to stem the clear 
exploitation of contraband labor despite repeated orders and regulations calling for fair wages.191  
While government laborers suffered exploitation at the hands of their employers, women and 
children forced to sign labor contracts fared little better, as private employers also exploited and 
abused them, while government authorities did little to enforce the regulations of the contracts 
even when they resulted in clear mistreatment. 
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In late 1864, Frank T. White, the provost marshal, issued an order requiring all 
contrabands to work either for the government or for a private employer with a labor contract.192  
He stated that employers had to provide “good compensation” to the contrabands, at the rate of 
twelve dollars a month for men and five dollars a month for women.193  Contrabands who could 
not find any other job had to sign a labor contract with a private employer, and even though the 
army had set wage rates, employers often “forced” contrabands to sign contracts designating 
lower wages, and some even only provided “nothing more than food and clothing” as 
compensation, and army authorities failed to intervene and prevent such mistreatment.194  Peter 
Hack, for example, hired Sidney Hach for one year but only provided food, clothing, and shelter 
as compensation.195  Peter C. Mason, meanwhile, hired Harriet Selby for six dollars every three 
months, but also required her to buy her own clothing and food, although he did provide clothing 
for her children.196  As a final example, a Mr. Dix hired David Chandler for fifteen dollars a 
month, but failed to provide food, clothing, or shelter for him or his family.197  Even worse for 
contrabands forced into an exploitative contract, the army “rigidly enforced” the contracts and 
refused to allow them to leave an abusive employer no matter how harsh the labor conditions.198  
The system of labor contracts, therefore, demonstrates the consequences of the army’s emphasis 
on self-reliance and the free labor ideology, as officers focused on reducing dependence and 
forcing the contrabands to work without regard to exploitative employers seeking to take 
advantage of the vulnerable contrabands.  Furthermore, while army officers supervised the 
                                                          
192 Lieut. Col. Frank T. White to Col. E.W. Smith, 28 February 1865, in Freedom: The Upper South, ed. Berlin, et al, 
226.  
193 Ibid, 230.  
194 Berlin, ed., Freedom: The Upper South, 107.  
195 Labor Contract No. 81, RG 105, Virginia, National Archives. 
196 Labor Contract No. 107, RG 105, Virginia, National Archives.  
197 Labor Contract No. 87, RG 105, Virginia, National Archives.  
198 Berlin, ed., Freedom: The Upper South, 107.  
 
 
38 
 
creation of the contracts, they failed to ensure employers actually abided by their provisions, 
providing additional opportunity for exploitation that continued until the end of the war in 1865. 
Overall, whether at the fortifications of Hampton, the camps of McClellan’s army, 
Craney Island, government farms, contraband camps, or the farms of private employers, army 
authorities exploited and abused contrabands in order to support the war effort, maintain 
economy, and avoid dependence on the government.  Officers failed to provide rations, clothing, 
shelter, and wages, failed to intervene to stop epidemics, impressed workers by force, and 
tolerated mistreatment of contrabands by abusive soldiers and private employers.  As Engs 
writes, “The majority of blacks spent their first years of freedom in wretched poverty, confined 
to inadequate housing in refugee camps, and barely able to subsist on irregular government 
wages or scanty government rations.”199  While the contrabands had escaped slavery, therefore, 
they found a quasi-freedom marred by poverty, disease, separation of families, and 
overcrowding, but still managed, through hard and difficult labor, to overcome the worst of the 
army mistreatment and become, in the words of Robert Engs, “freedom’s first generation.”200  
Hundreds of miles to the South, another group of contrabands would face a similar battle, not 
just against army mistreatment but also exploitation by another group of northerners: plantation 
lessees.  
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CHAPTER II 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
 
The South Carolina Sea Islands, located just off the coast, had a “black majority, large 
plantations, the slaveholders’ seasonal absence… and a task organization of labor.”201  
Therefore, every plantation contained very large numbers of slaves, giving the area a much 
higher proportion of slaves than Tidewater Virginia.  In addition, the slaves worked the task 
system, where they completed a given task each day, and had much more independence than 
slaves in other areas of the South that used the gang labor system.202   
In November 1861, a Union naval flotilla commanded by Admiral Samuel Francis Du 
Pont arrived and occupied the islands without opposition.  All of the whites immediately fled the 
area, leaving their slaves behind.  In contrast to Virginia and Washington, therefore, Union 
troops encountered large numbers of slaves whose masters had left, rather than slaves who ran to 
the lines in small groups.  As Du Pont wrote, the whites fled due to fear of their slaves rather 
than the Union military, and he refused to use his sailors to protect the slave property of 
rebels.203  Du Pont, however, foreshadowed the racism soon demonstrated by Union authorities 
by remarking that the slaves “were filthy but friendly, with scarcely any modification of the pure 
African feature.”204  One of these slaves, Sam Mitchell, became scared of the gunfire and went to 
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his mother for comfort from what he believed to be a thunderstorm.  His mother replied, “Son, 
dat ain’t no t’under, dat Yankee come to gib you Freedom.”205  During four years of occupation, 
the Yankees would grant Mitchell and his fellow contrabands freedom, but would also compel 
them to grow cotton for government superintendents and plantation lessees, both of whom 
abused and exploited contraband laborers. 
In December 1861, while military authorities were still trying to come up with a plan for 
the contrabands, a New Jersey businessman wrote to the Secretary of the Treasury asking to 
establish a plantation at Port Royal to grow cotton and argued that “a great moral influence 
would be exerted on the leading men in the rebellion” to give up the war.206  A group of Vermont 
investors, meanwhile, wanted to prove that free labor would be more productive than slavery by 
leasing plantations and hiring black labor.207  While federal authorities did not act on these 
suggestions in 1861, they foreshadowed the system of plantation leasing that would begin to 
emerge later in the war and contribute to gross exploitation of the contrabands.  In 1861, 
however, the army turned to military labor. 
General Thomas Sherman, the commander in the Sea Islands, set up contraband camps at 
Beaufort and Hilton Head, and placed General Rufus Saxton in charge of them.208  The 
contrabands eagerly arrived at first and took jobs working for the army, but the “discouraging” 
conditions in the camps caused many to leave in disgust.  They were paid three to five dollars a 
month, but also had to buy rations for their families and never received enough clothing.209  
According to B.K. Lee, the Superintendent of Contrabands at Hilton Head, the contrabands were 
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“very destitute” and had almost no clothing during their time working for the army.210  
Furthermore, soldiers working at the camps engaged in “plundering the negro houses of 
everything of any value” despite the threat of punishment.211  Worst of all, a smallpox epidemic 
ravaged the camps in 1862, the army only had six doctors to treat all of the contrabands, leading 
to inadequate care and higher mortality.212  The desolate conditions, combined with the fact that 
women and children in the camp did not work, caused General Sherman and the army authorities 
to consider another system for the contrabands that would not only put women and children to 
work in addition to the men, but also make money for the government to support the contraband 
program.  To the contrabands, it seemed suspiciously similar to the slavery they had left 
behind.213   
To raise the funds needed for rations, clothing, and other expenses, military authorities 
knew they had to force the contrabands to grow cotton.  The contrabands, however, supported 
themselves on their old plantations by growing food crops and had no interest in growing the 
crop associated with slavery.  Therefore, both the army and officials in Washington set up the 
superintendent system, where government superintendents would organize the contrabands and 
send them to work on plantations growing cotton for government benefit.214  The 
superintendents, furthermore, would be paid by Northern aid and missionary societies rather than 
the government, which cut government expenses even further.215  The goal of the program, as 
outlined by Edward L. Pierce, who inspected the area for the Treasury Department, became “the 
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integration of former slaves into the market economy” through the production of cotton using 
free labor, but specifically not to allow the contrabands to obtain land.216  Furthermore, Pierce 
claimed that the program would allow for contrabands to be “protected, educated, assured a 
secure family life, and paid wages.”217  For the contrabands, however, the reality remained far 
removed from even this ideal created by white officials, as superintendents impressed them, 
failed to pay wages or provide rations, and even failed to provide protection from Confederate 
guerillas, and the military authorities, rather than intervening, remained complicit in the 
exploitation of contrabands.  
Despite Pierce’s promises of “generally kind and humane” treatment, soldiers and cotton 
agents stole from contrabands who were already desperate to support themselves and their 
families.218  Soldiers in Port Royal, for example, despite the fact that authorities never enacted a 
policy for living off the land, stole not only the corn crop but also all of the livestock from the 
plantations, leaving them “miserably bereft” and the contrabands destitute without a way to 
support themselves by farming, since work animals were essential to all aspects of plantation 
agriculture.219  In addition, Pierce states that none of the plantations in the area had enough 
supplies to last the year due to the depredations of soldiers, indicating the scale of army 
exploitation of the contrabands.220  At Fuller Plantation on St. Helena Island, meanwhile, soldiers 
took five sheep and two lambs from contraband Richard Sams, and also stole most of the corn on 
the plantation without regard to the fact that it was the only sustenance for the contrabands, again 
demonstrating the degree of mistreatment not just by officers but common soldiers as well.221  
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Soldiers in the Seventy-Ninth New York, finally, stole cows and sweet potatoes from 
Superintendent Edward Philbrick’s plantation, again removing crucial sustenance crops from the 
contrabands.222  While these actions indicate clearly the degree of abuse and exploitation of 
contrabands in South Carolina, contrabands who managed to avoid theft still faced a different 
type of mistreatment. 
In February 1862, General Sherman issued General Order Number Nine, which outlined 
treatment of contrabands working on government plantations.  Superintendents had to pay 
regular wages, provide adequate rations and clothing, and treat contrabands humanely while also 
ensuring that they worked to support themselves.223  Later in 1862, another order designated 
wages of six dollars a month for first class laborers and four dollars a month for second class 
laborers, with both groups also receiving rations.224  However, as historian Willie Lee Rose 
writes, it was much simpler for generals and federal authorities to write orders “than it was for 
army officers in the field to carry them out,” and violations of the orders by superintendents 
became common while army authorities failed to intervene on behalf of the contrabands.225  
According to Gerteis, military authorities had no money for wages until late April 1862, and 
even then only had five thousand dollars for four thousand contrabands.  As a result, contrabands 
only made nine dollars a year from February 1862 until January 1863 for difficult plantation 
labor.226  In contrast, contrabands in Virginia made five dollars a month for military labor, while 
wages in Washington reached twenty dollars a month, indicating the scale of low wages in South 
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Carolina, especially when the army clearly had the resources to pay contrabands higher wages in 
other regions.227  Pierce noted such shortcomings but claimed that he did not want wages to 
become a “burden” to the government, even though they only amounted to forty cents a day, 
clearly indicating the priority of economy rather than contraband rights.228 
Numerous examples exist of such attitudes, as superintendents failed to pay contrabands 
and military authorities focused on economy did little to intervene.  At Coffins Point Plantation, 
Philbrick, the superintendent, had not paid the contrabands from December 1862 through March 
1863, and also failed to issue clothing or provide adequate medical care, forcing the contrabands 
to wear clothing eighteen months old.  Despite Philbrick’s complaints to the army, military 
authorities failed to issue him the clothing or money he needed, resulting in conditions so horrid 
that some contrabands stated that they had received better treatment from their old masters.229  
On Phrogmore Plantation, meanwhile, the contrabands also failed to receive adequate rations or 
wages from the government and prepared to leave for the contraband camps and jobs with the 
army, which at least promised regular wages, clearly showing the degree of mistreatment of 
plantation laborers since life in the squalid camps promised better compensation.230   
Unfortunately for the contrabands, these examples proved to be the norm rather than the 
exception, as Pierce reported that superintendents across the Islands failed to pay their 
contrabands regular wages or provide adequate food or clothing, and that northern aid societies 
had to intervene to prevent complete destitution.231  Furthermore, military authorities focused on 
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economy only issued rations to contrabands when soldiers stole their food crop, disregarding the 
fact that contrabands had no sustenance until they could harvest the first crop in the fall.232  As 
General O. M. Mitchel, the commander of the Department of the South, wrote, “I doubt whether 
the negros feel that their condition has been at all improved since their escape from the control of 
their masters” and that even “lower depths of degradation and suffering” may result “in 
consequence of the fact that the government cannot care for them.”233  Superintendents and the 
army, therefore, exploited contraband labor to make profits from cotton while expending as little 
as possible on wages and rations, which clearly demonstrates the priority of economy rather than 
the basic rights of the contrabands.  While contrabands on plantations across the Sea Islands 
suffered from a lack of wages, those on Edisto Island also had to face the threat of rebel 
guerillas, despite the fact that Union troops ostensibly occupied the Islands.  
At Edisto Island, a small group of Confederate raiders managed to recapture the island 
and several of the contrabands, who faced re-enslavement.234  The remainder had to leave behind 
their crops and flee to Port Royal as “impoverished refugees” with nothing but the clothes on 
their backs.235  As Brigadier General Rufus Saxton, the military governor, wrote, “Two thousand 
negroes have been thrown out of employment from the lands they were cultivating… and are 
now destitute upon my hands.”236  Furthermore, Saxton did not have adequate food and clothing 
or jobs on the plantations for the refugees, almost ensuring continued poverty since they had 
neither supplies nor a way to support themselves.237  He had to resort to hiring the contrabands to 
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make baskets for the army to give them a way to earn even minimal wages.238  In October 1863, 
several months after the raid, Secretary of War Stanton observed that “the freedmen were found 
to be in a destitute condition” and still had not received regular jobs and wages.239  By the end of 
the year, Stanton had authorized the recruitment of black soldiers to defend the plantations and 
end the guerrilla threat, but not before the refugees from Edisto Island suffered poverty or even 
re-enslavement at the hands of the rebels, demonstrating the inability of military authorities to 
protect even the freedom of the contrabands.240 
During the period of government plantations, another group arrived at the Sea Islands 
determined to help the contrabands.  Missionaries from New York and Boston, nicknamed 
“Gideonites,” arrived to teach the contrabands “civilization and Christianity” and to ensure their 
independence and ability to support themselves.241  During the course of the war, the 
missionaries tried to overcome racism, exploitation of contrabands by the army and plantation 
lessees, and the free labor ideology and truly improve conditions for the contrabands, but they 
faced obstinate resistance from government authorities who tended to ignore them and continued 
their mistreatment of contrabands.242  Colonel Nobles, for example, hated Edward Philbrick and 
his fellow missionaries, calling them “damned abolitionists” who wanted to “breed discontent 
among the negroes,” and actively worked to undermine his efforts at uplift.243  Many officers and 
plantation superintendents, in fact, viewed the missionaries as threats to their authority and tried 
to remove them from their plantations.244  Even worse, according to Willie Lee Rose, most of the 
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common soldiers held racist beliefs and hated the missionaries as being too generous to the 
blacks and did everything in their power to undermine them.245  Military authorities, therefore, 
rather than supporting the efforts of the missionaries to help the contrabands, viewed them as a 
threat to their system of contraband plantation labor and hindered their efforts at benevolence, 
clearly demonstrating the priority on free labor rather than the welfare of contrabands. 
While most of the missionaries remained committed to the mission of benevolence, 
meanwhile, some began to work with the government in the exploitation of contrabands.  Despite 
the resistance of the contrabands, missionaries compelled them to grow cotton on the 
government plantations, which they saw as the only way to earn money for uplift programs.246  
Worse, some missionaries started stores on the government plantations and charged inflated 
prices for basic necessities to cheat the contrabands out of their wages.247  These examples would 
be a preview of the later plantation leasing program, as some missionaries, particularly Edward 
Philbrick, put benevolence aside in order to make money, even if it meant the exploitation and 
abuse of the contrabands they had supposedly come to help.248  In the meantime, however, 
missionaries would be the one group opposing the direct tax sales of abandoned land, which 
would begin the exploitative process of plantation leasing.  
Prior to the direct tax sales, a debate ensued over the private leasing of plantations.  
Philbrick claimed that the government system was no better than slavery since the contrabands 
did not receive wages or clothing, and he advocated leasing a plantation and using clothing to 
pay the contrabands.  In particular, he argued that Colonel Nobles, a government superintendent, 
failed to provide rations or wages to the contraband laborers.  According to Philbrick, leasing 
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would solve these problems by allowing private enterprise to take over a government system that 
clearly was not working.249  Not all of those at the Sea Islands, however, agreed with his views.  
Edward L. Pierce hated the very idea of leasing and argued that lessees only wanted profit and 
would exploit the contrabands in order to make large profits, leading to “the worst vices of the 
slave system.”250  In June 1862, an act of Congress and its repercussions would prove Pierce’s 
argument correct, as government land sales led to rampant speculation and profit-seeking at the 
expense of the contrabands, clearly indicating the federal government’s emphasis on profit rather 
than contraband rights. 
The direct tax sales provide stark evidence of government complicity in allowing lessees 
to exploit the contrabands, in this case by denying them land and selling it instead to northern 
businessmen who mistreated the contrabands to make a profit.  The Direct Tax Commission 
formed to regulate the sales and favored wage labor rather than independent land ownership.  As 
historian Lawrence N. Powell writes, “Federal authorities were reluctant to lease or sell 
subdivided plantation tracts to the freedmen.”251  In addition, he argues, northerners and 
government officials thought that blacks needed to learn from businessmen before becoming 
qualified for land ownership.252  In making these arguments, he correctly assesses the true 
motives of the commission, which had the interests of businessmen and speculators rather than 
the contrabands in mind.  The Commission gained title to the land by claiming it for nonpayment 
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of taxes and sold it at open land auctions, giving Northern whites a clear advantage over the 
destitute freedmen, who could only bid for “charity land.”253 
Many groups working with the contrabands saw the true motives of the sales.  
Missionaries called for reform, allowing the contrabands to preempt small plots of land for later 
purchase, and the sale of small plots of land to avoid speculation, but the government did not 
change their policy, despite warnings of the profit motives of lessees and speculators.254  Another 
northern minister also unsuccessfully tried to illustrate the lack of land for contrabands and the 
consequences for their independence and well-being.255  Most telling, even army officials 
complained about the sales, including Brigadier General Saxton, who stated that “these helpless 
people may be placed more or less at the mercy of men devoid of principle” as speculators 
bought the land.256  Despite these complaints, at the actual auctions, sixty thousand acres were 
sold but twenty thousand went to speculators and most of the rest was reserved for government 
use, leaving very little for contrabands and leaving the path open to exploitation by lessees.257  
Furthermore, the land sales indicate how even army officials in the area were unable to prevent 
the federal government from exploiting contrabands in order to make a profit and increase 
government revenue. Most of the land purchased by army officials ended up with speculators 
anyway through resale.  The land sales, therefore, illuminate the true motives of both military 
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officials and the federal government: making profits to support the larger war even if it meant 
exploitation of contraband laborers.258 
Another example of government mistreatment of contrabands due to the focus on profits 
is the failure of the land preemption initiative. This program, set up by Saxton and other 
sympathetic officials on the islands, would have allowed contrabands to purchase land at $1.25 
per acre for a maximum of forty acres.259  Saxton did not consult the Direct Tax Commission 
before announcing his plan, however, and it met stiff opposition from the commissioners and 
officials in the Department of the Treasury, further indicating the complicity of the federal 
government in the exploitation of contrabands, even when military officials were trying to 
prevent such mistreatment.  Tax commissioner William Henry Brisbane argued that “The true 
friend of the Negro… ought to encourage white men to purchase plantations among them as 
protectors, teachers, and employers” at government land auctions.260  He also argued that 
speculators would take advantage of the contrabands at any type of land auction, but still called 
for the end of preemption based on a lack of available land for the contrabands.261  In September 
1864, the Secretary of the Treasury cancelled preemption, which, Ira Berlin argues, led directly 
to the destitution of the contrabands and to the entry of lessees who focused on profit rather than 
black rights and dignity.262  As Lieutenant Colonel Edward W. Smith, referring to the eviction of 
contrabands who had preempted land that was later sold to whites, said, it was a “monstrosity of 
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administration as would shock the conscience of Christendom.”263  In contrast to Virginia and 
Washington, where federal authorities never broached the topic of giving land to the 
contrabands, officials in South Carolina briefly considered it before allowing speculators and 
lessees to take over the land and exploit contraband laborers.  
In the land sales that followed the cancellation of preemption, fifty percent of the 
available land went to lessees, who quickly hired contraband labor for the plantations.  The end 
of preemption, therefore, demonstrates the government’s focus on profits at the expense of the 
rights of contrabands, who not only were denied access to land for themselves but then faced 
with working for exploitative lessees who would stop at nothing to make money.  As Colonel 
Smith stated, the government’s “yielding to the clamor of greedy avarice” would have disastrous 
consequences for the contrabands, as the lessees proceeded to exploit their laborers while army 
authorities did nothing to stop it.264   
Lessees paid lower wages for planting and maintaining the crop than for picking in order 
to force the laborers to stay on the plantations, and often provided only garden plots rather than 
rations, forcing the contrabands to grow or buy their food with their meager wages, and often, 
also buy clothing.265  Even worse, according to the New York Tribune, planters would sell their 
crops and “run away with the proceeds, leaving the Negroes in rags and foodless, with winter 
just coming on,” clearly indicating that lessees focused on profit and exploited contraband 
laborers to get it, and that local authorities did nothing to stop them.266  Lessees also used 
creative tactics to lower labor costs, including cutting a month “into discrete units of labor-time” 
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to reduce hours worked and therefore wages.267  Perhaps the most telling evidence of 
mistreatment is that many contrabands ran away from lessees due to exploitation and abuse, and 
some even said that the lessees treated them worse than their old masters had during slavery.268  
The fact that local military authorities not only allowed the land sales to lessees but then did 
nothing to stop them from abusing contrabands clearly indicates a focus on profits and ensuring 
the labor of the contrabands rather than protecting their basic rights.  As a New England aid 
society stated, the contrabands’ faith in Northerners is “too often abused” due to lessee 
mistreatment.269  In fact, a lessee from Boston provides the clearest example of exploitation of 
contrabands by lessees in order to make a profit, while army authorities stood by and did 
nothing.  
Philbrick purchased or leased one third of the land on St. Helena Island and hired 
contraband labor.  He claimed to pay $6.50 a month, but truly only paid $4.40 a month and did 
not pay the laborers at all during “slack months,” so the contrabands truly only made $3.30 a 
month (or fifty five cents a day).270  These rates, which compared very poorly to government 
salaries in Virginia and Washington, indicate a focus on profit rather than contraband rights, and 
military authorities failed to enforce their own wage regulations, allowing Philbrick to continue 
to exploit his laborers.271  His opinion that high wages caused idleness and that blacks had to 
support themselves only further reveals his true motives.272  As Powell argues, “Philbrick 
disdained the practice of giving privileges to laborers” and “made them buy everything that they 
might need for their daily existence” despite the very low wages he paid them, clearly proving 
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his focus on profit.273  In fact, he grew seventy three thousand bales of cotton for only twenty 
thousand dollars labor costs and made eighty one thousand dollars profit, clearly indicating his 
real reason for leasing land in South Carolina, especially since he initially arrived as a missionary 
supposedly devoted to helping the contrabands before becoming a lessee.274 
Both federal and military authorities could have stopped Philbrick’s clear exploitation of 
contrabands but failed to act.  Philbrick himself acknowledged his low wages in a letter to the 
Direct Tax Commission, stating that he makes his laborers use the crop to feed themselves and 
takes away wages for subpar work, showing both his clear exploitation of the laborers and the 
failure of government officials to enforce their own regulations.275  Furthermore, several of the 
contrabands working for Philbrick wrote to President Lincoln in a desperate attempt to improve 
their labor conditions and end Philbrick’s abusive behavior.  They stated that Philbrick’s wages 
“were not enough to sustain live,” and that he charged excessive prices for basic necessities at 
plantation stores.  Even worse, despite the ban on corporal punishment, one of Philbrick’s agents 
whipped a freedwoman and never faced punishment.276  No record exists of Lincoln or any other 
government official disciplining Philbrick or attempting to enforce their own orders and 
regulations, indicating a focus on the larger war effort at the expense of the welfare of the 
contrabands.  Furthermore, Philbrick was just one of many lessees exploiting and physically 
abusing contrabands in South Carolina, and federal authorities from Lincoln down to local 
military commanders failed to do anything to prevent it.  Such neglect, along with the land sales 
themselves, effectively demonstrates the federal government’s focus on economy, revenue, and 
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the larger war effort rather than protecting the basic rights of the contrabands.  This conclusion 
agrees with historians such as William C. Harris, who argues that the federal government 
focused on reunion and the war before emancipation and contraband rights throughout the war, 
and James M. McPherson, who argues that slaves did force the federal government to focus more 
on emancipation, but that the war effort always remained the central focus, especially since 
Union victory was necessary to achieve emancipation.277 
By this point, the continued exploitation of the contrabands had caused “widespread 
distrust of the intentions of the Government” among the freed people, and the abuses only 
continued during the later stages of the war.278  The behavior of common soldiers did little to 
change this attitude, as soldiers abused and robbed the contrabands with seeming impunity 
despite the presence of officers who had the power to curtail such behavior.279  At Saint Helena 
Island, seven intoxicated sailors beat several contrabands, killed their cow, and even attempted to 
rape several black girls before the contrabands successfully subdued them.280  William Mitchell, 
meanwhile, testified that soldiers stole his mule, which he had been given by Union officers for 
his help on a military expedition.281  In a truly horrid example of soldier abuse of contrabands, 
drunken officers of the Twenty-Fifth Ohio raped a woman while claiming to search for recruits, 
establishing that officers committed such depraved exploitation of contrabands.282  According to 
General Saxton, the soldiers, who generally held racist views, stole crops, livestock, and money 
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and even sexually assaulted women, and did not face anywhere close to appropriate military 
discipline for their actions.  Such actions, he stated, were “demoralizing to the negro and have 
greatly hindered efforts for their improvement and elevation.”283  Even the highest military 
authority in the area, therefore, knew that soldiers abused and exploited contrabands and 
acknowledged the failure to address the problem, indicating that protecting the contrabands was 
not the highest priority.  The abuse by soldiers would continue, as recruiters for United States 
Colored Troops regiments used increasingly harsh measures to gain recruits, even to the point of 
shooting contrabands they claimed to be deserters, without penalties from army authorities or the 
War Department.284 
In March 1862, around the same time as the land sales, General Hunter, commander of 
the Department of the South, instituted a program of conscription of contrabands for United 
States Colored Troops regiments.285  The fact that white soldiers in the area left for the front in 
Virginia hastened the need to form regiments to defend the islands.  When enough volunteers did 
not come forward, therefore, Hunter resorted to impressment of contrabands by force to fill the 
regiments.286  As Rose writes, “squads of soldiers forcibly herded them into the camps” for 
enlistment.287  She further argues that the “military authorities treated the islanders as suited their 
convenience, with utter disregard for the claims of humanity,” especially since the draft occurred 
right after planting season, leaving only women and children to tend the crop.288  Officers of the 
Twenty-Fifth Ohio, for example, repeatedly abused contrabands who resisted impressment and 
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even raped women while claiming to search for recruits.289  Another officer, according to a 
missionary, was “a terror to the whole black population” due to his harsh tactics of 
impressment.290  The soldiers, furthermore, were given monetary rewards for bringing in recruits, 
and impressed men with little regard for the welfare of families who depended on their wages.291  
When General Saxton “ordered an indiscriminate conscription of every able-bodied colored man 
in the Department” in late 1864, contrabands tried to run to the woods or swamps but still could 
not escape the impressment squads, which oftentimes consisted of black soldiers.292  Military 
authorities, therefore, indiscriminately drafted contrabands for service regardless of whether they 
had existing jobs on plantations or families to support.  Once the contrabands reached the army, 
furthermore, the exploitation continued, as military officials failed to provide support to their 
destitute families. 
When soldiers impressed contrabands from their jobs, they gave no regard to making sure 
the contrabands had received all the pay due them.  According to a missionary, a “shameful 
delay in the payments” to recruits had caused their families “suffering for want of the means to 
purchase clothing” and other necessities.293  Such delays, another missionary claims, were 
caused by bureaucratic slowness at the Quartermaster’s Department, which handled payment for 
government laborers.294  Even worse, a drought caused widespread crop failure in 1864, leaving 
“many black women, children, and old people in desperate straits” since the miniscule wages 
given to soldiers were not enough to purchase food, especially since soldiers received wages 
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irregularly at best.295  At the same time, commissary officials, trying to reduce expenses and 
prevent “dependency,” cut off rations to the families of soldiers, resulting in destitution 
becoming, according to Berlin, “distressingly common” as women and children had little to eat 
since even the food crops failed to thrive.296  As the commander of a black regiment stated, the 
stoppage of rations had rendered the families of his soldiers to a “deplorable condition” without 
food or clothing, and the seven dollars a month wages for soldiers did not provide nearly enough 
for purchasing basic necessities.297  Military authorities, therefore, not only forced contrabands to 
enlist, but then failed to pay them decent wages and cut off rations to their families despite a 
devastating crop failure, leaving them destitute with no means of support.  
The contrabands forced to enlist, meanwhile, suffered harsh treatment once they reached 
the army.  Quartermasters refused to provide them with tents despite having more than enough 
for white recruits, refused to provide medical care to sick recruits, and also delayed their 
payments much more frequently than they did for whites.298  The white common soldiers, 
furthermore, exhibited a “degree of hatred really fiendish towards the black regiment” and not 
only abused the black troops but continued to steal crops and livestock from their families left 
behind, further worsening the already desperate food situation.299  The conscription of 
contrabands, therefore, not only resulted in destitute families, but also in the exploitation and 
abuse of soldiers drafted into the army but not given even decent treatment by their officers and 
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fellow soldiers, and their families were left impoverished and starving.  In 1865, the arrival of 
thousands of refugees from Sherman’s March only worsened the situation.  
When General William Tecumseh Sherman marched through Georgia in 1864, thousands 
of slaves fled to his army seeking freedom and protection.  By the time he reached Savannah, ten 
thousand contrabands followed his army, and Sherman wanted to send them somewhere else to 
increase the mobility of his army for future campaigns.  In addition, members of his army “had 
abused defenseless ex-slaves” and generally held racist views.300  Sherman sent the contrabands 
to the Sea Islands, where they arrived destitute and in desperate need of government aid.  The 
commander in the area, meanwhile, focused on the need to “lessen the number of idle and 
dissolute persons” in the area and sent all contrabands without a job to the poor house, where 
they would labor on a “chain gang” for no wages.301  Furthermore, military authorities began 
destroying boats used by some contrabands to gain their livelihood through fishing, in order to 
prevent smuggling to the Confederacy but truly to force all of the contrabands onto 
plantations.302  The loss of boats, according to plantation superintendent Theodore Holt, “greatly 
distress[ed] many hundreds of poor men and families, whose dependence for food is chiefly fish” 
and were physically unable to farm, leaving them dependent on rations from military authorities 
focused on cutting rations as much as possible.303  The contrabands, therefore, did find freedom 
with Sherman’s army, but still not decent treatment, as they either had to work on a plantation or 
face unpaid labor under brutal conditions in a workhouse.  Ironically, Sherman stepped in to try 
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to help, but he ultimately failed to provide the contrabands with the land they needed to truly 
gain independence. 
In February 1865, Sherman met with several black leaders to develop a long-term plan 
for the contrabands.  Garrison Frazier, one of the black leaders, stated that the contrabands 
needed land which they could farm until they earned enough to buy it from the government.304  
In addition, he called for the end of impressment, stating that blacks wanted to be soldiers and 
that they would enlist voluntarily.305  Sherman agreed, setting aside the islands from St. John’s 
River in Florida to the South Carolina Sea Islands “for the settlement of the negroes” and even 
stated that only blacks could live on the islands, allowing them to manage their own affairs.306  
He also banned conscription and impressment and designated forty acres per family, with 
priority given to families of soldiers.  Finally, he ordered military authorities to give contrabands 
“possessory title” to the land until his plan was approved by higher authorities.307 
Once the contrabands began to take possession of the land, however, Sherman’s ideal 
quickly disintegrated.  Army authorities did not have enough shelter or clothing, and many 
contrabands died of disease before they could begin to farm.308  Even worse, Sherman’s 
promissory title to the land did not hold up permanently, as the contrabands lost their land during 
Reconstruction, either to federal authorities or, more commonly, to former Confederates who had 
received pardons and the right to their property.309  Sherman, therefore, not only promised 
contrabands land when they truly only had temporary title, but then Treasury authorities gave the 
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land back to the very men who had held the contrabands as slaves.  Sherman’s land program, 
therefore, ended four years of government mistreatment of the Sea Islands contrabands. 
Overall, whether in military labor camps, government plantations, land auctions, leased 
plantations, or on land supposedly granted to the contrabands, army authorities in South Carolina 
exploited contrabands during the entire war, and federal authorities not only failed to stop such 
practices, but approved the leasing programs that directly contributed to exploitation.  Army 
authorities focused on revenue allowed land sales, and speculators who had no regard for the 
welfare of contrabands leased plantations.  Furthermore, an emphasis on dependency caused 
them to cut off rations even during a crop failure, leaving contrabands to face starvation with 
nowhere to turn for help.  Finally, the free labor ideology contributed to the institution of wage 
labor rather than land ownership, and even Sherman’s attempt to grant the contrabands land 
came to naught.  Therefore, military officials, lessees, and tax agents exploited contrabands for 
four years without any intervention from federal authorities, clearly indicating the failure of 
Congress and the President to protect the contrabands.  This failure is illustrated most effectively 
through an analysis of Washington, D.C., where military authorities exploited contrabands in 
squalid, disease-ridden camps located within sight of the federal Capitol itself. 
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CHAPTER III 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 
 
In Washington, before officials could come up with a policy for how to treat contrabands 
in the capital, they had to decide whether to accept fugitive slaves into Union lines to begin with.  
While slaves arriving from Virginia clearly were enemy property subject to confiscation, 
fugitives from Maryland raised the issue of determining whether a master was loyal or disloyal 
in order to assign the slave the status of contraband.310  In 1861 and 1862, therefore, Congress 
passed a law banning the army from enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act and returning even the 
slaves of loyal masters to relieve officials from having to determine the loyalty of a master.311  
However, since Washington, unlike Virginia and South Carolina, remained under the direct 
control of Congress for the entire conflict, federal authorities had much more say in policy than 
in the other two regions, and the federal judiciary stepped in to influence fugitive slave policy. 
Despite the passage of the First Confiscation Act, masters from Maryland continually 
entered the District to reclaim their slave property, helped by guards from the local police who 
captured fugitives at the Navy Yard Bridge separating Maryland from Washington.312  
Furthermore, even though the army could not return fugitives, the federal government still could 
enforce the Fugitive Slave Law, especially when Lincoln, concerned about the loyalty of the 
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Border States and Maryland in particular, called for the return of fugitives from Maryland.313  In 
1862, the federal circuit court appointed fugitive slave commissioners and began to hear 
rendition cases despite the furious protests of local blacks, and even local military commander 
James S. Wadsworth, who tried to help the fugitives but often failed.314  In addition, soldiers did 
not care where fugitives were from, saw their value as laborers, and accepted them into the lines, 
while government authorities continued to return Maryland fugitives to slavery.315  According to 
historian Kenneth Winkle, “All fugitive slaves who could not prove their state of origin or the 
disloyalty of their owners were treated as… subject to return under the Fugitive Slave Law,” and 
federal authorities actively returned fugitives to Maryland throughout the early stages of the 
war.316  Even though the army tried to help fugitives, therefore, the federal government, focused 
on the loyalty of the Border States, returned them to slavery unless they could prove their owner 
was disloyal, indicating that the government placed the war effort and worries about the Border 
States ahead of the welfare of fugitive slaves and contrabands. 
When fugitive slaves from Maryland were arrested, furthermore, they were turned over to 
the District police and marshal Ward S. Lamon, who ran the Washington City Jail.317  As 
historian Margaret Leech writes, the jail was “a disgrace to the community” and the cells were 
“dark, unsanitary, and ill-ventilated.”318  In winter 1861, the jail, designed to hold a maximum of 
one hundred prisoners, held two hundred, including sixty fugitive slaves, and ten prisoners were 
held in an eight by ten foot cell.319  According to William S. Wood, the commissioner of public 
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buildings for the District, “The old jail is now crowded with more than double the number of 
persons… than can be kept there with any regard to cleanliness or health. … It is unfit for the 
purposes of a jail.”320  Lamon often falsely accused runaway slaves of crimes in order to justify 
their imprisonment even when no master came to reclaim them, and District police even arrested 
contrabands who worked for the Union army and falsely claimed that they were fugitives from 
Maryland.321   
After an investigation by detective Allan Pinkerton, who saw the value of the contrabands 
to the Union army as laborers and spies, the jail began to gain overwhelming negative publicity.  
The Washington Evening Star wrote that the “jail of Washington… is miserably constructed, 
badly lighted, and poorly ventilated, and… it is inhuman to confine even the vilest criminals in 
its reeking cells.”322  Congress finally acted in late 1862 and released all fugitive slaves from the 
jail and ordered Lamon to only hold fugitives one month, and, if no master came to claim them, 
they were freed.  A Senate report stated that “a barbarous system of punishment had been 
practiced upon colored persons in the jail” including “torture” and that it had to stop 
immediately.323  The federal government, therefore, finally acted to end the abusive practices of 
the District police, but only after untold numbers of fugitives had been arrested and held in 
deplorable conditions even when no master came to claim them, indicating the low priority given 
to the rights of contrabands and fugitive slaves early in the war.  While federal action does 
indicate closer federal oversight than Virginia or South Carolina, where local commanders acted 
almost entirely on their own, it still indicates a preventable lack of initiative since the 
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government only acted after hundreds of contrabands had been held as runaways and criminals in 
horrific conditions. 
The behavior of the District police and Maryland slave catchers did sharply reduce public 
support for the Fugitive Slave Law and made army officers even more willing to protect 
fugitives from local authorities.  Officers of the Seventy-Ninth New York protected ten fugitives 
from the police, but two were captured and sent back to slavery in Maryland, indicating that even 
the army could not protect fugitives from the local authorities, especially since the federal 
government still supported rendition.324  By this point, however, violent public protests, along 
with the Second Confiscation Act, which mandated a loyalty oath for reclaiming a slave and 
freed all slaves of disloyal masters, made the Fugitive Slave Act, according to historian Kate 
Masur, “unenforceable” in the District.325  While contrabands who made it to the army no longer 
had to worry about arrest and rendition, therefore, they still faced squalid camps plagued with 
disease, hunger, and crushing poverty, while army authorities that had been so eager to protect 
them from the police did little to improve the appalling conditions. 
While multiple forms of work, including government farms and leased plantations, 
provided jobs for contrabands in Virginia and South Carolina, the federal government remained 
“the largest employer” throughout the war for contrabands in Washington.  Private employers 
‘had to match or better the terms offered by military employers if they hoped to attract and retain 
black workers.”326  In addition, the federal government assumed the responsibility of providing 
for the families of workers, including housing, clothing, rations, and medical care.327  In 1862, 
Military Governor Wadsworth ordered wages of twenty dollars a month for laborers and twenty 
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five dollars a month for skilled teamsters, which he claimed to be double the wages given to 
farmhands in the North.328  The contrabands never received full wages, however, as paymasters 
deducted five dollars monthly for the support of the hospital as well as destitute women and 
children.329  Even these reduced wages failed to come regularly, especially early in the war, as 
military authorities more afraid of “the specter of poverty and dependency” on government 
charity failed to provide even minimal compensation to military laborers.330 
According to Ira Berlin, contrabands “were eager to work and willing to perform more 
grueling tasks, at lower pay, and under stricter supervision, than even the most desperate white 
workers would tolerate,” but were not rewarded with decent treatment or compensation for their 
difficult labor.331  Many contrabands only received pay once every three months if that, as 
military authorities believed that food and freedom were adequate compensation.  The lack of 
wages, furthermore, forced contrabands to buy basic supplies on credit at “exorbitant prices,” 
placing them in crippling debt.332  In addition, the five dollar tax, combined with the failure to 
pay adequate wages, left the contrabands with “barely enough to make ends meet” and support 
their family members who could not work.333   
G. W. Simms, for example, worked as a military blacksmith for eleven months at a 
supposed wage of thirty dollars a month, but due to the tax and irregular payments was unable to 
support his family.334  Contrabands working for the quartermaster, furthermore, failed to receive 
any wages for an entire year, leaving them “in great need,” but Quartermaster General 
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Montgomery Meigs refused to grant them any back pay, stating that their rations were the only 
compensation necessary, without regard to the needs of their families.335  According to a 
missionary teacher, military authorities also cut off wages and rations to contrabands who 
became ill, leaving their families unable to purchase food, and only the intervention of aid 
societies prevented them from starving.336  The worst example of exploitation, however, is the 
fact that officers pocketed the five dollar tax rather than using it to support the destitute, 
indicating the low priority that they gave to contraband welfare and the lengths they would go to 
exploit the contraband laborers.337  Furthermore, the failure to provide regular wages and rations 
demonstrates the fear of dependency on government charity and the desire to make the 
contrabands support themselves, without regard to the high prices at stores or the needs of their 
family members unable to perform difficult military labor.  These families, along with the 
workers themselves, also had to live in a series of squalid camps, as unprepared army authorities 
repeatedly failed to provide even minimally adequate shelter. 
At the beginning of the war, lacking a clear plan on where to house the contrabands, 
Wadsworth sent them to Old Capitol Prison, both as a shelter and as protection from the District 
police.338  At the prison, however, the contrabands were housed near white prisoners, causing 
opposition from many officers in the area who wanted them housed in segregated camps.339  
Furthermore, the prison was so overcrowded that “the negroes by scores, can hardly be provided 
for with any comfort to themselves or to the whites,” and smallpox broke out in the squalid 
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prison.340  Seeking to stem the epidemic and prevent it from spreading to white prisoners, 
Wadsworth ordered the contrabands moved to Duff Green’s Row, a “cluster of tenements” that 
was little better than the prison and in fact even worse, as disease and poverty plagued the camp 
during its entire tenure as a contraband settlement.341 
In June 1862, the same time that the contrabands moved to Duff Green’s Row, command 
of the camp passed to Danforth B. Nichols, a missionary who worked closely with the army to 
superintend contraband affairs, set up and maintain camps, and try to find work for the 
contrabands.  However, the Union army’s military maneuvers, particularly the Peninsula 
Campaign, brought in more fugitives than the army had prepared for, and Duff Green’s Row 
quickly proved inadequate for housing the contrabands.  By summer, twenty contrabands arrived 
each day, mostly destitute and in desperate need of food, clothing, and shelter that army 
authorities simply did not have.342  The contrabands were given passes and documents verifying 
their freedom but little else, and Nichols hired them to private employers in order to prevent their 
dependency on the government.343  As Johnston writes, the army remained determined to avoid a 
“welfare mentality” among the contrabands and also to spend as little as possible on supplying 
them.344  Ideas of economy and free labor, therefore, contributed to the hiring out of contrabands, 
and employers only had to promise decent treatment to hire contrabands from Duff Green’s 
Row.345  The employers, however, quickly violated such promises.  According to Nichols, “from 
the moment the contraband… gets any money he is the victim of fraud and robbery” by private 
employers who cheated contrabands out of wages and then charged excessive prices at stores, 
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leaving the contrabands in hopeless debt.346  Along with the irregular wage payments for 
government workers, such mistreatment by private employers clearly demonstrates the priority 
of free labor and avoiding dependency rather than ensuring the welfare of the contrabands.  The 
focus on economy, furthermore, would have even more devastating consequences. 
The overcrowding at Duff Green’s Row quickly contributed to widespread disease, and 
the army failed to provide adequate shelter or medical care to stem the repeated outbreaks.  As 
Berlin writes, “In the close quarters of Duff Green’s Row, sanitary conditions deteriorated and 
disease spread rapidly,” as three hundred sixty contrabands crowded into a camp meant to hold a 
maximum of fifty.347  According to Harriet Jacobs, an escaped slave working as a nurse in the 
camp, diphtheria, scarlet fever, and typhoid raged through the camps, and the contrabands were 
“in the most pitiable condition.”348  Nichols and the army, meanwhile, remained occupied with 
hiring out contrabands and did little to address the worsening conditions at the camp.349  By June 
1862, ten contrabands died a day, and nurses had “nothing at hand to administer to the comfort 
of the sick and dying.”350  In addition, the contrabands, even the desperately ill, only had “filthy 
rags” for beds, and some had no bedding at all.351  According to Jacobs, it was “almost 
impossible to keep the buildings in a healthy condition” due to the shortages and overcrowding, 
leading to horrific consequences when smallpox began to spread through the camp in the 
summer of 1862, as army authorities continued to neglect the basic medical needs of the 
contrabands even during an epidemic.352 
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According to historian Kenneth Winkle, the overcrowding and inadequate sanitation at 
Duff Green’s Row made a smallpox epidemic “inevitable,” but Nichols and the army medical 
staff failed to take any preventative action.353  Furthermore, most of the contrabands came from 
rural areas and had never been exposed to smallpox, meaning that they would be susceptible to 
the disease if an epidemic occurred.  The medical staff, however, only ordered vaccinations for 
white soldiers and aid workers at the camp and refused to vaccinate the contrabands, causing 
devastating mortality rates when the disease arrived in summer 1862.354  The failure to vaccinate, 
therefore, provides clear evidence of army mistreatment of contrabands in Washington, as they 
failed to use a simple procedure that could have prevented the epidemic, but chose to only 
vaccinate white workers, indicating both a focus on economy and sheer medical neglect of the 
contrabands.  Furthermore, doctors failed to quarantine contrabands afflicted with smallpox, 
allowing the disease to spread rapidly through the camp, further indicating the neglect of even 
basic medical care for the contrabands.355  According to Oakes, twenty contrabands died every 
day from smallpox, and shortages of medicine, shelter, and clothing only worsened during the 
epidemic.356  Winkle cites one seventy year old contraband dying of smallpox “found lying in a 
pile of manure” and left to die by army doctors without even minimally decent shelter or medical 
care.357  The epidemic became so horrific that even white Washingtonians, often indifferent to 
the contrabands at best, were “aghast” at the death toll and appalling neglect in the camp, 
indicating the scale of mistreatment and abuse at Duff Green’s Row.358  As Jacobs wrote, “Those 
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fearful eyes often looked up to me with the language, ‘Is this freedom?’.”359  For the contrabands 
at Duff Green’s Row, freedom was plagued by poverty, overcrowding, epidemic disease, and the 
failure of Nichols and military authorities to do anything to stem the rising mortality rates. 
By August 1862, the smallpox epidemic had become so widespread in the camp that 
military authorities decided to move the camp to another location away from the pestilence.360  
Nichols and the army doctors left the smallpox patients at Duff Green’s Row, which became a 
smallpox hospital, and moved the healthy contrabands to Camp Barker, a set of military-style 
barracks designed to alleviate the overcrowding that pervaded the Row.361  The new camp, 
however, did not prove to be an effective solution, as disease, poverty, and overcrowding 
continued, while Nichols and the army officers who staffed the camp focused on helping the 
contrabands as little as possible to avoid dependency, despite the clear evidence of need.  
At Camp Barker, overcrowding continued despite the new barracks.  According to Berlin, 
two to three families lived in every ten by twelve foot barracks room, and twenty six people lived 
in one small cabin.362  In addition, inadequate sanitary facilities and privies contributed to the 
spread of disease, while army doctors again failed to provide proper medical care.363  When 
smallpox again ravaged the contrabands despite the move from Duff Green’s Row, army doctors 
initially failed to vaccinate the contrabands, and then, as the epidemic spread, attempted 
vaccination without success due to a bad batch of vaccine matter, and the disease ravaged the 
camp.364  By November 1862, twelve to fifteen contrabands died every day of smallpox and 
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other diseases, and the hospital, according to a Quaker missionary, was “ill-ventilated and 
disgusting in the extreme,” which only raised the death rate.365  The outbreak worsened in 
summer 1863, as twenty five contrabands perished every week from disease, and reached its 
nadir in January 1864, when one hundred fifty died in one month.366  Even worse, army doctors 
delayed the treatment of smallpox victims until they could decide whether to admit them to the 
hospital for paupers or contrabands, causing many to die without receiving any treatment.367  By 
April 1863, according to historian Allan Johnston, seven hundred contrabands had died of 
disease, revealing the horrific consequences of overcrowding and medical neglect of the 
contrabands and the low priority given contraband welfare by army medical authorities, even 
during repeated smallpox epidemics.368  Even for contrabands who managed to survive the 
outbreak, however, another danger loomed that threatened their freedom. 
Despite the fact that District police could no longer detain fugitive slaves and the army 
could not return them even to loyal masters, contrabands at Camp Barker still were not safe from 
the threat of re-enslavement.  Fugitives from Maryland were banned from the camp and forced to 
find housing in the District, where they had to live in the “worst areas of Washington,” which 
were plagued by “disease, crime, and destitution.”369  Citizens of the District, according to 
Johnston, were “unwilling to accept their presence and foster their well-being,” leaving them to 
settle in the most dangerous parts of town with often inadequate shelter and barely enough to live 
on.370  Even the contrabands in Camp Barker were not safe, as Maryland masters unaware of the 
exclusion policy continuously raided the camp, exposing the contrabands to the threat of 
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kidnapping and re-enslavement.371  The raids, therefore, demonstrate the inability of the army to 
protect contrabands from small raiding parties even in the military headquarters of the Union, 
clearly demonstrating a lack of concern for the basic rights of the contrabands.  Furthermore, the 
exclusion policy, which was enacted to prevent the confiscation of Unionist property to appease 
Maryland slaveholders, indicates a continued focus on the loyalty of the Border States even into 
1862 and 1863.  Furthermore, it demonstrates the subordination of contraband welfare to the 
need to ensure the loyalty of Maryland.   
Another priority of the Union army and federal government, free labor and the 
requirement for contrabands to avoid dependency and become self-sufficient, also negatively 
affected contraband welfare.  This policy was common in all three regions throughout the war.  
The army evicted Virginia contrabands who would not work on government farms, and forced 
South Carolina contrabands to grow cotton for either the government or lessees.  While little 
farmland existed in Washington, the army still forced contrabands to work for the government or 
to a private employer approved by the government, or leave the camps and survive on their own 
with no assistance.  The idea of self-sufficiency, therefore, directed contraband policy in all three 
regions to the detriment of contraband welfare.  In particular, Camp Barker, according to Berlin, 
was set up as a temporary employment depot, and contrabands working at the camp only 
received six dollars a month along with rations in order to entice them to find work elsewhere.372  
According to Winkle, half of the contrabands found government jobs, either for the army or for 
various government agencies in the Washington area.373  For the rest, however, they faced much 
more tenuous work assignments.  Nichols, the superintendent of the camp, wanted the facility to 
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be self-sufficient and ordered all contrabands, even children, to work for the camp or find a job 
elsewhere.374  He maintained the practice of hiring contrabands out to private employers, who 
continued to exploit the contrabands with low wages, high prices, and failure to provide 
essentials such as food and clothing.  Some employers even laid off the contrabands without 
paying any wages, and neither Nichols nor the army authorities did anything to prevent such base 
exploitation.375   
Even worse, Nichols sent many contrabands, mostly children forcibly separated from 
their families, to work in Maryland, where slavery remained legal.  The contrabands protested 
vociferously, stating their fears of returning to a slave state, but Nichols continued to allow 
Marylanders to hire contrabands, including one man who clearly had Confederate sympathies.376  
Nichols himself admitted that “some” contrabands were indeed re-enslaved upon arrival in 
Maryland, but continued the practice anyway.377  These labor practices, especially sending 
contrabands to a slave state, indicate the degree of emphasis on free labor and self-sufficiency, 
even risking the freedom of the contrabands to compel them to work.  Furthermore, the desire to 
reduce expenditures led to the requirement that all contrabands work, even if that meant bringing 
in exploitative private employers.  Finally, the raids at Camp Barker had clearly demonstrated 
the real motives of Marylanders, but rather than driving them away, Nichols and the army 
allowed them to hire contrabands, bringing to light the true consequences of free labor and self-
reliance for the contrabands who thought that Camp Barker would ensure their freedom. 
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The contrabands who remained in the camp, furthermore, faced another form of 
mistreatment: abuse by Nichols and the military administrators.  Nichols himself admitted that 
Captain Mackey used “corporal punishment” on the contrabands for relatively minor offenses, 
and does not describe any attempts to discipline Mackey for such blatant abuse.378  Lewis 
Johnson, meanwhile, testified that Nichols “was not very kind” and stated that Johnson “may as 
well be dead” when he tried to get the wages he was justly owed, especially since Nichols 
required cash for all purchases of even basic supplies.379  Kesiah Briggs, meanwhile, testified 
that Nichols viciously whipped a woman for refusing to go to the smallpox hospital, which 
would expose her young child to the disease.380  When Patsy Scott approached Nichols for her 
housing ticket, Nichols refused to give her housing and not only berated her but also beat her 
despite her pregnancy, and she had a miscarriage soon after.  According to Scott, Nichols treated 
her worse “than my old master would do.”381  These cases not only indicate abuse by Nichols, 
but also the failure of military authorities both at the camp and around Washington to stop it. 
These contrabands testified to a military court inquiry, but the abuse only continued, 
demonstrating the clear neglect of contraband welfare by the army in Washington. 
Two cases more than any other exemplify the direct participation of Nichols and soldiers 
in the mistreatment of contrabands.  Betsey Brown, a washerwoman for the commissary, became 
ill and needed blankets and warm clothing. She lived in a tent that was “full of holes” since 
Nichols refused to replace worn-out tents due to an emphasis on economy, even though they 
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directly contributed to disease during harsh weather.382  When she went to Nichols to get the 
basic supplies she desperately needed, Nichols claimed that she did not work hard enough 
despite her government job and long-term illness and did not deserve anything, even though her 
son, a soldier in the United States Colored Troops, was killed in combat.383  Furthermore, he beat 
her and threatened to have the military arrest her if she complained again, indicating the degree 
of emphasis on self-sufficiency and the terrible consequences for the contrabands.384 
When Lucy Ellen Johnson arrived at camp, Nichols refused to give her rations even 
though her husband worked for the government, ordering her to work as well.  When she 
protested, Nichols ordered the guards, soldiers from the Eleventh New York Volunteers, to arrest 
her and take her to the guardhouse.385  The guards kicked and hit her repeatedly, before whipping 
her and tying her up by the thumbs for half an hour before officers finally intervened to end the 
sadistic punishment.386  Even worse, Captain W. L. Frisbie had not only failed to stop the torture 
but actually ordered his soldiers to use the increasingly harsh measures, and continued in this 
manner until stopped by superiors.387  Such behavior by soldiers, and especially officers, clearly 
illuminates the degree of exploitation and abuse of contrabands at Camp Barker, and the failure 
of higher authorities to effectively intervene to prevent such abuse, as the camp was located 
within blocks of federal offices.  While federal authorities did step in occasionally, they provided 
little oversight and failed to stop the repeated abuse of contrabands.  Furthermore, the abuse also 
demonstrates the preference of economy and self-reliance over contraband rights, as army 
quartermasters and Nichols refused to provide even basic supplies, leading to preventable deaths 
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from exposure, and the War Department and other federal agencies refused to intervene, 
demonstrating the low priority given to contraband welfare. 
In Washington, in contrast to the other two regions, federal authorities and the army 
attempted to help alleviate horrendous conditions in the camps, even if their intervention was 
often belated.  The federal government abolished slavery in the District in April 1862, but never 
created a clear policy for contrabands, leading to delays that cost the lives of large numbers of 
contrabands.388  Furthermore, authorities did not want disease-ridden contraband camps to spread 
epidemics to the city at large, which would undermine the Union headquarters, leading to 
frequent moves farther from the city center.389  While the federal government intervened much 
more in contraband policy in Washington than in Virginia or South Carolina, therefore, delays 
and the continued focus on self-sufficiency prevented significant improvement, and contrabands 
continued to face mistreatment and exploitation throughout the war.  
By late 1863, Camp Barker became so overcrowded and disease-ridden that the 
Quartermaster’s Department finally acted and began searching for a new location for the 
contrabands.  Lieutenant Colonel Greene, the chief quartermaster, recommended land in 
Arlington where contrabands could farm and also live in a rural area free of disease outbreaks.390  
Accordingly, quartermasters set up a one thousand acre space with five large farms for the 
contrabands to grow subsistence crops.391  In addition, quartermasters promised schools, job 
training, and ample housing for the contrabands, in addition to wages of ten dollars a month for 
work at the village.392  When smallpox again hit Camp Barker in December 1863, therefore, 
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Nichols and Colonel Greene opened Freedmen’s Village and began to transfer the contrabands, 
hoping that they would be eager to leave Camp Barker for an idyllic life on a farm.393  The 
reality would prove to be quite different, as, after a move marked by brutality and wanton 
physical abuse, contrabands arrived to find a half-finished complex with inadequate shelter, 
leading to further outbreaks of disease the village was designed to prevent.  
When Greene announced the move to the contrabands at Camp Barker, many resisted the 
planned relocation.  They feared separation of their families and also hated Nichols, who many 
saw as abusive.394  One contraband told a missionary that he “would rather starve in 
Washington” than move to another camp under Nichols.395  Greene and Nichols ignored their 
complaints, however, and began to move the contrabands in winter 1863-1864.  Most of the 
contrabands fled Camp Barker to avoid having to move, and had to find housing and food on 
their own in the already overcrowded city.396  Many, according to Winkle, ended up “homeless, 
helpless, and starving,” and the army did nothing to help them.397  In addition, soldiers cleared 
contraband settlements in the District and surrounding areas and forced the inhabitants to move 
to the Village.  For example, soldiers cleared a well-appointed camp on General Robert E. Lee’s 
property at Arlington that was located near the village, and ordered all contrabands to leave, even 
“a dying child.”398  Reacting to the move, one contraband stated that he would return to his “old 
master” and that he had been treated worse by the Union army than by his owner.399  Louisa Jane 
Barker, a missionary, agreed, stating that the move constituted “a tyranny worse than their past 
                                                          
393 Ibid, 257. 
394 Berlin, ed., Freedom: The Upper South, 257.  
395 Testimony of Georgiana Willets, January 1864, in Freedom: The Upper South, ed. Berlin, et al, 330.  
396 Berlin, ed., Freedom: The Upper South, 257.  
397 Winkle, Lincoln’s Citadel, 347.  
398 Testimony of Mrs. Louisa Jane Barker, January 1864, in Freedom: The Upper South, ed. Berlin, et al, 312. 
399 Ibid, 312.  
 
 
78 
 
experiences of slavery.”400  Even worse, General Christopher C. Augur, the commander of the 
Department of Washington, ordered the move because the settlement “injured the look of the 
Estate which the government intended to sell at the best advantage,” which demonstrates perhaps 
more than anything else the neglect of contraband welfare by military authorities and the degree 
of exploitation they accepted in order to achieve economy and revenue.401 
When the contrabands reached the camp, meanwhile, they found conditions little better 
than those they had left behind.  The cabins were unfinished, forcing contrabands to sleep in 
tents, “shivering against the cold wind and damp ground,” and the exposure led to yet another 
outbreak of smallpox, even though they had been moved out of Camp Barker to avoid 
smallpox.402  Furthermore, Nichols and Greene, continuing the emphasis on economy, forced the 
contrabands to buy firewood in the winter and banned them from cutting their own supply, 
causing many to suffer without heat during a bitter winter.403  Quartermasters also diverted 
supplies from the village to contrabands working for the army, further worsening the shortages 
of basic supplies.404  As a missionary stated, shortages of food, clothing, and medicine caused 
“much suffering,” and a lack of doctors only worsened the misery of the sick.405 
The labor practices, which seem to anticipate sharecropping and other exploitative 
practices that emerged during Reconstruction, also, according to Winkle, “emphasized the 
profitability and military contributions of the camp at the expense of the contrabands’ needs.”406  
Men received ten dollars a month, but the five dollar deduction remained intact, and contrabands 
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also had to pay three dollars in monthly rent for their cabins, leaving them with almost no money 
to buy supplies, including firewood.407  In addition, in a system similar to leasing in South 
Carolina, Nichols continued to hire the contrabands out to private employers, and would not let 
them quit their jobs and return to the village even if their employers abused them.408  Nichols, 
however, primarily viewed the camp as a source of military labor and government revenue, and 
began to impress contrabands for work on the fortifications and other military jobs despite their 
protests and the separation of families that ensued.409  Furthermore, just as in Virginia and South 
Carolina, recruiters for the United States Colored Troops impressed contrabands and forced them 
to enlist, even interrupting a church service to search for recruits.410  When Greene replaced 
Nichols with Captain Joseph M. Brown in 1864, conditions slowly improved within the village, 
and many contrabands who remained there and managed to avoid impressment began to see it as 
home rather than a temporary camp.411  However, impressment continued, and Nichols re-
emerged at Mason’s Island, where conditions would be much worse for the contrabands sent 
there from the village. 
Mason’s Island was set up as a temporary employment depot in 1864 to find jobs for 
able-bodied contrabands so they would no longer be dependent on government support.  Brown 
sent contrabands who could work from the village to the island whether they consented or not.  
As Berlin states, “He displayed scant sympathy for the freedpeople’s desire to control the 
conditions under which they worked and lived.”412  Nichols hired contrabands out to private 
employers and even separated children, including Carter Holmes, from their parents and 
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apprenticed them to area farmers, and then failed to intervene when these employers mistreated 
their contraband laborers.413  For contrabands waiting to be hired out, furthermore, conditions on 
the island were dreadful.  The barracks had no beds, forcing contrabands to sleep on the floor, 
and they quickly became overcrowded as Brown sent contrabands faster than Nichols could hire 
them out.414  As a result, disease spread quickly, and forty-eight contrabands died in August 
1864, followed by sixty in September.415  The labor practices and conditions on Mason’s Island, 
therefore, illustrate the priority of economy and self-reliance by Nichols and the quartermasters, 
as Brown and Nichols focused on hiring the contrabands out and removing them from 
government support, without regard to the consequences for the contrabands, including disease 
and horrid conditions on the island, separation of families, forced hiring of children, and abusive 
employers.  For the contrabands on Mason’s Island, therefore, freedom did mean an escape from 
slavery, but it did not mean an end to separation of families, impressment and forced labor, 
indicating the degree of army mistreatment of contrabands in Washington, D.C. 
While most of this chapter covers the District of Columbia, a brief analysis of the 
experiences of contrabands in Alexandria, just south of the Potomac in Virginia, is warranted 
here since they also experienced mistreatment and exploitation at the hands of the army. General 
Samuel P. Heintzelman, the commander in Alexandria, refused to build housing for the 
contrabands in order to keep them away from the city, but more and more kept coming despite 
his efforts.416 For the contrabands, Union lines meant freedom, and they kept arriving in order to 
gain “freedom, safety, and employment” despite the horrendous conditions.417  The provost 
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marshal, John C. Wyman, stated that the lack of housing required “the crowding of them to such 
a degree as must prove exceedingly dangerous to their own, and perhaps to the health of the 
city.”418  As Wyman feared, the lack of shelter contributed to the spread of disease among the 
contrabands.  A missionary with the Rochester Anti-Slavery Society stated, that “women and 
children are sick and dying, not for want of necessary food, but for want of suitable shelter from 
this cold storm.”419  Furthermore, smallpox began to spread in the overcrowded city, causing 
high mortality among the susceptible contrabands, including five hundred deaths in winter 1862.  
Heintzelman still refused to build barracks, stating that contrabands would be dependent on 
government support and not work if they received free housing, indicating the emphasis on self-
reliance rather than the welfare of the contrabands.420  The numbers of contrabands in the city, 
however, finally forced him to build barracks to alleviate the overcrowding and disease that 
pervaded the city, but, while the contrabands received shelter, they also faced another form of 
exploitation.421 
In an effort to “reduce expenses and foster self-reliance,” Heintzelman and Albert 
Gladwin, the superintendent, charged rent for barracks rooms, even though contrabands working 
for the government rarely received regular wages.422  Gladwin charged the contrabands four to 
five dollars a month for space in a room that held twelve to sixteen people, even though many 
contrabands working for the government had not received any wages for five to six months.423  If 
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contrabands could not pay the rent on time, even due to illness or the lack of wages, Gladwin 
evicted them and forced them to survive on their own in the city with no help from the 
government.424  These contrabands, reported Harriet Jacobs, were “packed together in the most 
miserable quarters, dying without the commonest necessities of life,” and could only receive help 
from overwhelmed aid societies.425  Furthermore, Gladwin forced those unable to work to 
relocate to Arlington, even though the move resulted in the separation of families.426  The 
contrabands remaining in Alexandria, furthermore, could no longer receive government rations 
and had to purchase their own food, even if they had not received any wages.427  Gladwin and the 
army authorities, therefore, focused on self-reliance and reduction of government expenses rather 
than the welfare of the contrabands to the degree of evicting those unable to pay rent through no 
fault of their own to die on the streets with no access to rations or medical care.  Medical care, in 
fact, remained lacking even for the contrabands able to remain in the barracks. 
In the overcrowded barracks, smallpox continued to spread and army medical authorities 
did nothing to stop it.  The only nurses were contrabands themselves, and conditions in the 
hospital continued to deteriorate.  According to missionary Ulysses B. Ward, the contrabands 
received “little if any medical attendance,” and the decaying hospital became “the complete 
realization of destitution and misery.”428  As a result, mortality rates rose to a peak of seven 
hundred deaths in two months, and the medical neglect continued, as a surgeon only came to the 
hospital every two days if that.429  In addition, soldiers confiscated blankets from contrabands, 
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even the sick, claiming that they constituted government property, and then sold them for their 
own profit, clearly demonstrating the degree of army exploitation of contrabands in 
Alexandria.430  As Captain William McLean Gwynne, an army inspector sent to investigate 
conditions in the city, stated, their “condition is made much worse by being made free,” as a lack 
of wages, exorbitant rents, ration cutoffs, and the lack of medical care combined to create terrible 
conditions for the contrabands.431  The fact that the War Department did nothing in response to 
his report and actually praised the army for teaching self-reliance exemplifies the low priority 
given to contraband welfare, and the focus on reducing expenses no matter how bad the 
conditions.432  Federal authorities, therefore, not only failed to stop the military from exploiting 
contrabands, but actually praised them and directly contributed to its continuation, efficaciously 
demonstrating the mistreatment of contrabands by both military and federal authorities in the 
Washington area. 
Overall, whether in the Washington city jail, Duff Green’s Row, Camp Barker, the 
Freedmen’s Village, or Alexandria, army authorities exploited, impressed, and abused 
contrabands in order to reduce expenditures, foster self-reliance, and support the larger war 
effort.  Local commanders failed to pay workers, housed them in squalid, disease-ridden camps, 
forcibly relocated them, and separated their families through apprenticeship and impressment.  
Furthermore, the contrabands performed vital military labor, and received only mistreatment in 
return.  As Allan Johnston writes, the contrabands “found themselves firmly entrenched at the 
bottom of Washington’s social and economic scale, frequently destitute, and abandoned by 
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all.”433  Despite these obstacles, however, the fact that contrabands worked for the government in 
the national capital “reinforced the claims of all black people to the rights of citizens.”434  Army 
and federal authorities, therefore, while they could exploit contrabands, impress them, and even 
arrest them, could not deny them the ability to fight for the basic right of citizenship, and the 
freedmen would claim this right in another battle after the guns of the Civil War fell silent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
433 Johnston, Surviving Freedom, 141.  
434 Berlin, ed., Freedom: The Upper South, 262. 
 
 
85 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, military authorities in all three regions abused and exploited contrabands 
in order to enforce self-sufficiency, reduce government expenditures, and focus resources on the 
war effort, while the federal government in Washington not only failed to stop it but, on some 
occasions, even supported the military’s contraband programs.  There are some differences 
among the regions, however, that further nuance the behavior of the military.   
While Virginia and South Carolina contained ample land for government farms, 
Washington did not until the Freedmen’s Village was established in Arlington, making the 
military the largest employer and leaving the contrabands with few choices to escape exploitative 
jobs with the army. South Carolina not only contained available land, but much of it was 
abandoned and available for the government.  The army and Treasury Department briefly 
considered giving land to contrabands before inviting lessees to purchase land at auction, leading 
to the exploitative leasing system unique to South Carolina and indicating clearly the focus on 
profits and revenue rather than the welfare of the contrabands.  Virginia, meanwhile, became the 
only region to experience an extended military campaign, and the presence of McClellan’s 
soldiers only increased opportunities for abuse, as the army placed contraband welfare well 
behind military objectives and exploited contrabands in the name of military necessity, 
demonstrating the focus on the war effort at the expense of contraband welfare.  While 
contrabands in Washington and South Carolina never faced a military presence like that in 
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Virginia, they were still exploited and abused in the name of military necessity, but not to the 
same degree as those in Virginia during the Peninsula Campaign.  Finally, since Washington was 
the only region of the three analyzed here to be adjacent to a border slave state, contrabands there 
faced the unique possibility of being arrested as fugitives by the local police, held in deplorable 
conditions, and returned to slavery while the military stood by and did nothing.  In all three 
regions, however, the military exploited and abused contrabands while the federal government 
did nothing to stop it, no matter the particular military situation or location of the region. 
There are also similarities common across all three areas.  First, the army controlled 
contraband programs, including hiring laborers, setting up camps, regulating supplies of rations, 
clothing, and other essentials, and providing medical care.  Army authorities fell short of these 
objectives, as they failed to pay wages, cut off rations, tolerated squalid, disease-ridden camps, 
and refused to provide medical care even during epidemics.  Federal authorities did little or 
nothing to improve the situation for the contrabands.  In particular, military authorities who came 
to all three areas to fight rebels were unprepared for the massive influx of contrabands.  The 
large numbers of fugitives forced them to create haphazard policies including ramshackle camps 
and government plantations, leading to massive relief expenditures, which led to the emphasis on 
economy and self-reliance that worsened conditions.  In addition, army recruiters and 
quartermasters used often brutal impressment measures to force contrabands either to enlist or 
work for the army, without regard to separation of families, and often failed to pay proper wages, 
leaving the families of these workers destitute, clearly indicating the emphasis on the war effort 
and self-reliance rather than contraband welfare.  Finally, private soldiers in all three regions 
exploited, stole from, and abused contrabands, and their officers failed to stop it.  The army, 
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therefore, focused on economy, self-reliance, and the war effort, and exploited and abused 
contrabands, and the federal government did nothing to curtail it. 
Overall, the army authorities in Virginia, South Carolina, and Washington, D.C. 
exploited and abused contrabands in order to reduce relief expenditures and save money for the 
war, foster self-reliance among the contrabands and avoid dependency on government support, 
and use available resources for the larger war effort rather than programs for the contrabands.  
Furthermore, the federal government never created a unified policy outlining the proper 
treatment of contrabands, forcing unprepared army officers more interested in fighting rebels to 
come up with programs of their own, directly contributing to exploitation and neglect.  As James 
Oakes writes, “Tens of thousands were ripped from their communities, families were physically 
separated, the contrabands- sometimes frozen- often starving, got sick and died in the very 
process that was supposed to free them,” and both the army and the federal government failed to 
substantially improve conditions.435  Such neglect foreshadowed the reality after the war, as the 
Freedmen’s Bureau briefly enforced the rights of freedmen and tried to protect them from abuse, 
but disappeared at the end of Reconstruction, abandoning the freedmen to the control of the very 
white southerners who had enslaved them.  Sharecropping, tenancy, convict leasing, and other 
practices that aimed to replicate slavery as closely as possible quickly arose and persisted until 
the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. One hundred years earlier, the policies of the United 
States Army, combined with the neglect of the federal government, caused many contrabands to 
ask, “Is this freedom?”  For Carter Holmes and the rest of the contrabands in Virginia, South 
Carolina, and Washington, D.C., the answer was nothing but freedom.  
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